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ARTICLES
THE BATTLE OVER STRICT SCRUTINY:
COALITIONAL CONFLICT IN THE REHNQUIST
COURT
Richard A. Brisbin, Jr.*
Edward V. Heck**
The Constitution of the United States is a document that pro-
vides for both rights and powers. The United States Supreme Court
has the task of interpreting the "majestic generalities" 1 of the consti-
tutional text and resolving cases that bring into play the inherent
conflict between governmental power and individual rights. Over the
years, the justices have developed many verbal formulas to aid in the
task of interpreting the Constitution. Although commentators often
criticize specific tests or condemn the Court for too wide a variety of
tests,2 the justices have continued to rely heavily on verbal formulas.
During recent decades the standard of strict scrutiny has become a
centerpiece of contemporary First Amendment and equal protection
analysis.
This article analyzes the application of strict scrutiny and its
"heightened scrutiny" variants during the first four years of the
Rehnquist Court. During the later years of the Warren Court and
the entire Burger Court, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. exercised a
noteworthy role in urging his colleagues to utilize heightened scru-
tiny formulas to achieve liberal policy results. Because of Brennan's
leading role in fashioning the language of strict scrutiny and struc-
turing discourse about rights within the Court, the first four years of
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, West Virginia University; Ph.D., Johns Hop-
kins University, 1975.
** Professor of. Political Science, San Diego State University; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins
University, 1978.
1. West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
2. See, e.g. ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES (1989); JUDITH A. BAER,
E UALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 26-31, 112-30 (1983).
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the Rehnquist Court constitute a vital period in the development and
evolution of strict scrutiny discourse. During those years, two ap-
pointees of President Ronald Reagan, Justices Antonin Scalia and
Anthony Kennedy, joined the Court. Although the justices they re-
placed were not closely allied with Brennan, the new justices ini-
tially appeared exceptionally hostile to many equal protection and
first amendment claims.3 At the end of the period, Brennan retired,
leaving the Court stripped of the intellectual progenitor of strict
scrutiny. Thus, the period considered in this Article marks the arri-
val of the "new" conservatism of the Reagan era on the Court and
the swan song of Brennan.
This article will set the background for analysis of the Rehn-
quist Court decisions with an overview of heightened scrutiny as a
form of means-ends discourse in constitutional interpretation.4 The
article then examines the use of heightened scrutiny and the applica-
tion of divergent standards of review in a variety of types of First
Amendment cases (freedom of expression and association,' free exer-
cise of religion,' and establishment of religion'), as well as equal
protection8 and substantive due process cases.' This article's argu-
ment is that the trend during the Rehnquist Court has been toward
the use of divergent standards of review in different settings. All
members of the Court during this period used the concept of strict
scrutiny in their discourse on rights and equality, but their applica-
tions of the concept often differed from that favored by Justice Bren-
nan. Because the Court's use of strict scrutiny discourse in this pe-
riod appears to reflect a court internally divided about standards of
review, close attention will be paid to the coalitions of justices who
supported differing uses of strict scrutiny during this period.10 The
3. Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., The Conservatism of Antonin Scalia, 105 POL. SCL Q. 1
(1990); Sue Davis, Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist's Opinion Assignments, 74
JUDICATURE 66, 71 n.36 (1990); Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, Constitu-
tional Discourse, and the Legalistic State, 44 W. POL. Q. 1005 (1991); John J. Carroll &
Arthur English, Justice Anthony Kennedy and the Structure of Government (Paper presented
at the 1990 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association).
4. See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 25-96 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 97-136 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 137-95 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 196-279 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 280-305 and accompanying text.
10. Analysis of both voting coalitions (the group of justices supporting a particular out-
come in a case) and opinion coalitions (the justices supporting an opinion explaining the rea-
sons for the decision) is a significant feature of the scholarly work of political scientists who
study the Supreme Court. See, e.g., David W. Rohde, Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in
the Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 208 (1972); DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J.
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article concludes with a discussion of possible futures for strict scru-
tiny and other forms of means-ends discourse about conflicts between
constitutional rights and governmental power.11
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT SCRUTINY
The concept of strict scrutiny and its concomitant compelling
governmental interest test were central to constitutional discourse
about equal protection and First Amendment rights in the Burger
Court era (1969-1986). During this era, Justices Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall pursued a moral goal when they read the Con-
stitution, a vision of an egalitarian society. To promote their moral
vision, through their "systemic" and "transcendent" textual ap-
proach,12 they placed a priority on rights values in the constitutional
text. Their attention to rights had an instrumental character. These
justices wanted to eliminate systemic bias against disadvantaged
groups from the American political process and to build a future
society on the transcendent value of human dignity that they found
expressed in the text of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment.18
To read systemic and transcendent rights values as central ele-
ments in the constitutional text, Brennan and Marshall adopted the
ideas of Justice Stone's famous Carolene Products footnote, the
fountainhead of modern strict scrutiny analysis."' Stone's opinion en-
dorsed the principle that the normal rule of deference to the legisla-
ture should prevail in cases involving regulation of "ordinary com-
mercial transactions," '15 but the footnote tentatively suggested the
possibility of "more exacting judicial scrutiny" of legislation restrict-
ing the political process, as well as the possibility of a "more search-
SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 193-210 (1976); Michael W. Giles,
Equivalent Versus Minimum Winning Opinion Coalition Size, 21 AM. J. POL. Scl. 405
(1977); Joseph F. Kobylka, Leadership on the Supreme Court of the United States: Chief
Justice Burger and the Establishment Clause, 42 W. POL. Q. 545 (1989).
11. See infra notes 306-13 and accompanying text.
12. WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
292-94 (1986).
13. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contempo-
rary Ratification, Presented to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C. (1985).
14. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938). The
Carolene Products footnote and other Roosevelt Court cases may be aptly characterized as the
seeds from which heightened scrutiny doctrine was to grow, but it has been noted that "[ilt was
not . . . until the period of the Warren Court (1953-69) that Stone's seeds would come to full
flower. "MURPHY ET AL., supra note 12, at 491.
15. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152.
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ing judicial inquiry" in the review of statutes attributable to
prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities." ' That such
"searching judicial inquiry" or "exacting scrutiny" should take the
form of a relaxation of the presumption of constitutionality seems
clearly contemplated in the first paragraph of the footnote, where
Stone suggested a "narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face" to violate
the First Amendment or other provisions of the Bill of Rights made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.1" In short,
Stone's Carolene Products opinion offers a formula for allocation of
the "burden of proof" in constitutional cases. Normally, the individ-
ual or corporation challenging a legislative act must carry the burden
of convincing the Court that the challenged legislation lacks a ra-
tional basis..On the other hand, the burden of convincing the Court
to uphold a statute falls on the government in cases involving funda-
mental rights, closure of the political process, or discrimination
against disadvantaged minorities."8 Reversal of the presumption of
constitutionality and imposition of the burden of justification on the
government are widely recognized as among the crucial characteris-
tics of strict scrutiny."'
As Professor and Constitutional Law Expert Russell Galloway
has pointed out, strict scrutiny is but one distinctive form of means-
ends discourse, that is, the examination of the purposes (ends) and
method (means) of governmental actions alleged to impinge upon
constitutional guarantees.2 0 As a means-ends test, strict scrutiny is a
16. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
17. Id. at 152 n.4.
18. In the original draft of the Carolene Products footnote, Stone expressly formulated
the new constitutional jurisprudence he was proposing in terms of allocation of the burden of
proof. "[Olne attacking the constitutionality of a statute may be thought to bear a lighter
burden," Stone wrote, "when the legislation aims at restricting the corrective political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." Reprinted
in MURPHY ET AL. supra note 12, at 486. When the footnote was revised under the prodding
of Chief Justice Hughes, the explicit burden of proof argument was eliminated, but the
thought remained in Stone's discussion of the presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 487-90.
19. See, e.g., JOEL B. GROSSMAN & RICHARD S. WELLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 285 (3d ed. 1988); Randall J. Fox, Equal Protection Analysis:
Laurence Tribe, the Middle Tier and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 525, 547-48(1980); Russel W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 449, 453 (1988) [hereinafter Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny]; Russel W. Gallo-
way, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 124 (1989) [here-
inafter Galloway, Basic Equal Protection[.
20. In a commentary that recognizes the emergence of more than three levels of scrutiny,
Professor Galloway has characterized means-end scrutiny as embracing a spectrum of stan-
dards, ranging from the aggressive strict scrutiny of the compelling governmental interest test
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mode of analysis that is extremely supportive of the rights' of claim-
ants. Following the broad outlines of the Carolene Products foot-
note, heightened scrutiny discourse presumes that legislation alleged
to invade constitutional guarantees is unconstitutional, and places on
governmental litigants the burden of persuading the Court of the le-
gitimacy of the challenged law. In the most stringent form of intensi-
fied scrutiny, the government must show that the challenged policy
serves a crucial or "compelling" governmental interest, is a substan-
tially effective means of furthering the compelling governmental in-
terest, and is a necessary or least restrictive method of achieving the
governmental goal." Strict scrutiny thus can be characterized as the
approach to constitutional analysis that is most solicitous of those
asserting constitutional rights against government. In theory at least,
it is a language that empowers the outsiders and minorities who
would challenge the policies of the political majority.
Thus, during the 17 years of the Burger Court, Brennan and
Marshall often sought to use the compelling interest standard to pro-
tect First Amendment rights and rights of voting and participation,
as well as to promote the equal treatment of various disadvantaged
groups." When dictated by internal divisions within the Court, they
were willing to modify strict scrutiny and employ a less stringent
form of heightened scrutiny, particularly the test requiring a govern-
mental litigant to show that the challenged law bore a substantial
relationship to an important governmental interest.28 In addition,
Brennan and Marshall took the position that the same intermediate
scrutiny standard originally applied in sex discrimination cases was
the appropriate test for evaluating governmental efforts to overcome
the effects of past discrimination through affirmative action
through a series of intermediate standards to the most deferential variation of rationality re-
view. Galloway, Means-Ends Scrutiny, supra note 19, at 451-58. For all levels of means-end
scrutiny that require the government to offer more than a "rational basis" justifying its action,
Galloway uses the term "intensified scrutiny" (the equivalent of "heightened scrutiny"), which
he characterizes as a "more aggressive, less deferential type of judicial review than rationality
review." Galloway, Means-Ends Scrutiny, supra note 19, at 453.
21. Galloway, Means-Ends Scrutiny, supra note 19, at 453-55.
22. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618. (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Opinion of Brennan, J.); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 329 (1980) (Brennan J.,
dissenting); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting in part); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-22 (1984).
23. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982).
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programs.2"'
No member of the Burger Court was more consistent in oppos-
ing the efforts of Brennan and Marshall to use the language of strict
scrutiny to benefit disadvantaged groups than Justice Rehnquist.
Thus, the promotion of Rehnquist-who had frequently dissented
from opinions applying heightened scrutiny standards-to Chief
Justice, along with the appointments of Scalia and Kennedy as Asso-
ciate Justices, created the potential for an approach to strict scrutiny
significantly different from that which prevailed in the Burger
Court. This article, therefore, will consider the use of strict scrutiny
and related forms of means-end scrutiny during the first four years
of the Rehnquist Court in cases involving First Amendment, equal
protection, and substantive due process issues.
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE REHNQUIST COURT
During the first four years of the Rehnquist Court, the justices
decided a wide range of cases dealing with the First Amendment
freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association. Laws regulating
political campaigns, restricting commercial speech, and outlawing
flag burning and obscenity hardly begin to encompass the diversity of
governmental actions challenged on First Amendment grounds dur-
ing the 1986-87 through 1989-90 terms. Outcomes varied, as did co-
alitions formed in support of or in opposition to First Amendment
claims pressed by litigants. Many cases were resolved without ex-
plicit discussion of strict scrutiny or the proper standard of review to
be applied. Yet found within this diversity is a striking pattern likely
to surprise those inclined to view the Rehnquist Court as overtly
hostile to judicial enforcement of constitutional rights. During the
first four years of the Rehnquist Court there was, in fact, wide-
spread support for the proposition that laws and government actions
restricting "core" political expression or association should be re-
viewed under the compelling governmental interest standard. In no
less than eight cases the Court invoked the most stringent form of
strict scrutiny to strike down laws restricting overtly political expres-
sion or association. 25 Although the voting patterns in these cases re-
24. University of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); (Opinion of Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
25. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312 (1988); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Eu v. San Francisco Democratic
Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); But-
terworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990);
1054 [Vol. 32
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flect shifting coalitions, enough different justices supported these
opinions to conclude that strict scrutiny was widely accepted as an
appropriate tool for striking the balance between individual liberty
and governmental power where political speech was involved. Nor
do the eight cases in which strict scrutiny was used to protect politi-
cal expression/association constitute the whole of Rehnquist Court
discourse on standards of review in freedom of expression cases. In
another case, a majority of the justices applied strict scrutiny and
ruled that the government had met the heavy burden of justification
imposed by the compelling interest standard. 6 Moreover, in many
other cases the justices applied varying forms of intermediate scru-
tiny, as well as engaging in spirited debates about the proper stan-
dard of review.27 Despite disagreements among the justices, height-
ened scrutiny was a significant-if not dominant-feature of the
First Amendment jurisprudence of the early Rehnquist Court.
The proposition that the most stringent form of strict scrutiny is
appropriate when government imposes restrictions on political ex-
pression or association gained majority support and was used to
strike down a federal law in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
L fe .2 Writing for a five-member majority that included Marshall
and Powell as well as Reagan appointees Scalia and O'Connor,"
Justice Brennan declared that "when a statutory provision burdens
first amendment rights, it must be justified by a compelling state in-
terest."' 0 Applying this standard, Brennan concluded that the Fed-
eral Election Commission had not offered a sufficiently compelling
justification for a federal campaign spending law prohibiting the use
of corporate treasury funds in electoral campaigns, when applied to
a corporation "formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass
capital."8 1 Joined in dissent by White, Blackmun, and Stevens, the
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990). A ninth case arguably falling
into this grouping is Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986). Al-
though the Court struck down a state law barring Independents from voting in the Republican
primary on freedom of association grounds in an opinion by Justice Marshall, there was no
explicit invocation of strict scrutiny in the majority opinion.
26. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). See infra notes
70-72 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 57-69, 75-96 and accompanying text.
28. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
29. Justice O'Connor agreed with Brennan on the standard of review and the outcome,
but did not join a section of Brennan's opinion discussing the impact of campaign spending
laws on MCFL.
30. 479 U.S. at 252.
31. Id. at 259. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the
majority limited FEC by upholding application to the Chamber of Commerce of a state law
1992] 1055
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Chief Justice argued that federal campaign financing regulations
should receive deferential treatment from the Court.
The debate over standards of review begun in FEC v. MCFL
continued in other cases in which five-member majorities used strict
scrutiny to overturn laws restricting political expression. In Boos v.
Barry,82 the Court struck down provisions of the District of Colum-
bia code that had the effect of prohibiting demonstrations critical of a
foreign government near that nation's embassy. Following basic
principles long articulated by Justice Brennan, Justice O'Connor
wrote for the majority that a "content-based restriction on political
speech in a public forum . . . must be subjected to the most exacting
scrutiny."33 Furthermore, she spelled out in rather precise language
the burden the government must surmount in order to regulate such
speech: "[W]e have required the State to show that the 'regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end'." 4 Even if international law provided a
compelling justification for protecting the "dignity" of foreign diplo-
mats, a broadly-worded antipicketing ordinance could not be consid-
ered a "narrowly tailored" means of achieving the desired end. Join-
ing the sections of O'Connor's opinion specifying the standard of
review were Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Scalia.
The far-reaching implications of O'Connor's opinion in Boos
became clear when Justice Brennan used it to strike down state and
federal laws prohibiting flag burning as a form of political protest. 5
Rejecting the "relatively lenient standard"3 6 of United States v.
O'Brien,87 because the government interest in prosecuting flag burn-
prohibiting campaign contributions from corporate treasuries. All justices in Austin agreed
that the compelling interest standard should be applied in such a case, but three Reagan ap-
pointees disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the state had met its heavy burden of
proof.
32. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
33. Id. at 321 (emphasis in original).
34. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
35. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990).
36. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
37. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court applied the four-part "O'Brien test" to uphold a
conviction for burning a draft card. Chief Justice Warren formulated the test for determining
the constitutionality of a law that has the incidental effect of restricting "symbolic speech" as
follows: "[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377 (emphasis added). Although used in
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ers was not "unrelated to the suppression of free expression,"3
Brennan cited O'Connor's Boos v. Barry opinion as the basis for
subjecting "the State's asserted interest in preserving the special sym-
bolic character of the flag to the 'most exacting scrutiny'." 9 A year
later, Brennan used virtually identical reasoning to strike down the
federal Flag Protection Act.40 Although O'Connor voted with the
dissenters to uphold these laws, Brennan gained a majority by pick-
ing up the support of Justice Kennedy, as well as Marshall, Black-
mun, and Scalia.
In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois' Brennan again
wrote for a 5-4 majority, applying strict scrutiny in a First Amend-
ment case. Joining him in striking down patronage-based employ-
ment practices in Illinois were Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens. Drawing on earlier opinions striking down patronage
dismissals,' 2 Brennan concluded that the patronage practices at issue
in this case burdened rights of political association and violated the
First Amendment unless they were "narrowly tailored to further vi-
tal government interests."" Abandoning his alliance with Brennan,
Justice Scalia explicitly rejected the strict scrutiny standard in favor
of a rational basis standard in cases involving government
employment.
Only Justices Brennan and Marshall were with the majority in
all five of these cases in which a closely-divided Court provided First
Amendment protection for political speech or association. In each
case they needed to win the support of three other justices to build
majority coalitions supporting the application of strict scrutiny. Each
of the associate justices joined the liberal duo in at least one of these
cases. Despite his desertion in Rutan, Justice Scalia was their most
reliable ally, joining the opinion supported by Brennan and Mar-
shall in four of the five cases. Indicative of the breadth of support for
applying strict scrutiny where political expression is involved is the
fact that only Chief Justice Rehnquist consistently dissented in these
cases. While no ringing theme runs through the dissenting opinions
of the Chief Justice and the shifting groups of moderate and con-
this case to reject a first amendment claim, the O'Brien test seems to reflect a form of intensi-
fied means-end scrutiny and can be considered a "relatively lenient" standard only in contrast
to the most stringent form of strict scrutiny.
38. Johnson, 491 U.S. 407.
39. Id. at 412, (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321).
40. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990).
41. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
42. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
43. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2376.
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servative justices who supported him, the dissenters generally favored
more deferential treatment of challenged governmental actions than
the shifting majority coalitions centered on Brennan and Marshall.
Even more impressive evidence of the Rehnquist Court's sup-
port for strict scrutiny where government regulates core political
speech are three unanimous decisions applying strict scrutiny to
strike down state laws imposing direct restrictions on such speech.
With the Chief Justice not participating, the Court declared uncon-
stitutional a California law prohibiting primary endorsements by po-
litical party governing bodies." In the Court's opinion, Justice Mar-
shall articulated the principle that a law burdening the speech and
association rights of political parties and party members "can survive
constitutional scrutiny only if the State shows that it advances a com-
pelling state interest ... and is narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est."" While conceding that stable government was a compelling
state interest, Marshall concluded that it was not clear how an en-
dorsement ban promoted that interest.' 6 Although Justice Stevens
could not resist adding a concurring opinion echoing Blackmun's
earlier reservations about the value of "compelling state interest"
and other "easy phrases" for constitutional analysis, he nonetheless
joined Marshall's opinion to make it the unanimous opinion of the
eight justices participating.' 7
Stevens authored an opinion in which a unanimous Court
struck down a Colorado law prohibiting the use of paid petition cir-
culators in a campaign to gather signatures to qualify an initiative
measure for the ballot."' Although he avoided "compelling govern-
mental interest" phraseology, Stevens noted that "exacting scrutiny"
was required and the State bore the burden of justifying the restric-
tive law because it burdened "core political speech.""' According to
Stevens, "the statute trenches upon an area in which the importance
of First Amendment protection is 'at its zenith.' For that reason," he
concluded, "the burden that Colorado must overcome to justify this
criminal law is well-nigh insurmountable. '5 0 Even Chief Justice
Rehnquist was willing to endorse this application of strict scrutiny
44. Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
45. Id. at 222.
46. Id. at 226.
47. Id. at 234 (Stevens, J., concurring), quoting Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Social-
ist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979).
48. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
49. Id. at 420-22.
50. Id. at 425.
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where political speech was involved.
In Butterworth v. Smith5 the Chief Justice himself wrote an
opinion striking down a Florida law prohibiting a grand jury wit-
ness from ever revealing his/her testimony. He began with the rec-
ognition that speech bearing on alleged government misconduct was
speech at the core of First Amendment guarantees. Rehnquist
avoided the "compelling interest" terminology, but concluded that a
prohibition on publication of lawfully-obtained truthful information
cannot be constitutionally enforced "absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order." 2
These eight cases, then, indicate remarkable unity on the pro-
position that the First Amendment's central meaning is the protec-
tion of political speech58 and that it is appropriate for the justices to
apply strict scrutiny in cases in which government restricts such
speech. The Rehnquist Court also found violations of First Amend-
ment rights in a significant number of cases less directly implicating
political expression, with Court majorities often invoking the com-
pelling governmental interest standard or other forms of heightened
scrutiny. In Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, the majority ap-
plied strict scrutiny to a claim of press freedom, invoking the compel-
ling interest standard to strike down a law imposing a discriminatory
tax on some kinds of magazines.54 In Riley v. National Federation
for the Blind" Justice Brennan used strict scrutiny to strike down
laws requiring charitable solicitors to reveal the percentage of funds
raised that were actually applied to charity. Strict scrutiny analysis
even found its way into majority opinions in the obscenity/pornogra-
phy field. In Sable Communications v. FCC" the Court split on the
constitutionality of federal regulations outlawing obscene dial-a-porn
calls, but the justices unanimously agreed that a ban on indecent
calls was not consistent with the compelling interest standard.
On the issue of commercial speech, the justices agreed that the
intermediate scrutiny approach based on Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Co v. Public Service Commission of New York"7 provided
51. 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
52. Id. at 632, quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
53. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
54. Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
55. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
56. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
57. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Justice Powell formulated the test to be applied in com-
mercial speech cases as follows: "At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
19921 1059
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the appropriate standard of review." There was, however, consider-
able coalitional conflict over whether this general standard should be
applied to lawyer advertising. In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,"
the Court ruled that the state could not categorically prohibit law-
yers from soliciting business by sending personalized letters to poten-
tial clients. Speaking for a majority of six, Justice Brennan applied
an intermediate scrutiny standard previously applied in lawyer ad-
vertising cases: "Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and
does not concern unlawful activities ... may be restricted only in the
service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through
means that directly advance that interest."' In a dissent joined by
Rehnquist and Scalia, O'Connor rejected previous lawyer advertising
cases and called for "greater deference to the States' legitimate efforts
to regulate advertising by their attorneys." 1 Although she accepted
the Central Hudson test and its standard of intermediate scrutiny,
O'Connor argued that many restrictions on lawyer advertising were
appropriate means of pursuing the substantial governmental interest
of "preventing the potentially misleading effects of targeted, direct-
mail advertising as well as the corrosive effects that such advertising
can have on appropriate professional standards."6 Similar coali-
tional conflict-though without explicit debate about the application
of intermediate scrutiny-was apparent a year later when the Court
reversed an Illinois Supreme Court decision censuring a lawyer for
holding himself out as a specialist in trial advocacy in violation of
bar association rules.63
In other cases the Court resolved conflicting claims of individual
and government on the side of litigants asserting First Amendment
rights without invoking the language of heightened scrutiny directly.
Conflicts involving freedom of the press, in particular, were resolved
in favor of the press without explicit discussion of standards of re-
view.64 In two majority opinions, Justice Marshall employed a bal-
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."
58. Bd. of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476 (1989).
59. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
60. Id. at 472, quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638
(1985).
61. Id. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1928 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
64. E.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Flor-
ida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524 (1989). The Court's unanimous decision to apply the "actual
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ancing approach that did not specify the applicable standard of re-
view to reject state efforts to restrict the associational rights of
political parties" and rhetorical speech on issues of public concern
by government employees.6 Other First Amendment opinions writ-
ten67 or supported by the Court's liberals" relied on overbreadth
analysis as a means of striking down unusually sweeping restrictions
on expressive activity. Yet, it is important to note that even these
opinions provide evidence that heightened scrutiny discourse was
pervasive in the Rehnquist Court's freedom of expression cases. In
Jews for Jesus, Justice O'Connor prefaced her opinion striking down
on overbreadth grounds a regulation barring "all First Amendment
activities" in the Los Angeles International Airport central terminal
with a doctrinal overview explicitly relating forum analysis and stan-
dards of review. This overview set out standards that ranged from a
compelling interest test applicable to government efforts to enforce
content-based exclusions in a public forum, through an intermediate
standard applicable to content-neutral time, place, and manner regu-
lations of expression in a public forum, to a deferential reasonable-
ness standard to test government efforts to restrict access to a non-
public forum.69 Significantly, all nine justices joined this opinion,
suggesting once again a broad consensus on the position that height-
ened scrutiny is an appropriate tool for enforcement of First Amend-
ment guarantees, particularly where political speech is involved.
Thus, despite some coalitional conflict both over levels of scru-
tiny and over the application of agreed-upon standards, the cases in
which the Rehnquist Court ruled in favor of First Amendment
claims reveal widespread support for application of some form of
heightened scrutiny in a variety of factual settings. Somewhat ironi-
cally, the clearest indication of the Court's consensus on the strict
scrutiny framework is Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce in
which the majority rejected a First Amendment claim." At issue was
a Michigan law prohibiting independent expenditures drawn from
malice" standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) to an emotional dis-
tress suit brought by a public figure also illustrates how the Court supported First Amendment
claims without explicitly employing heightened scrutiny. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988).
65. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
66. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
67. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (striking down on overbreadth grounds a city
ordinance outlawing speech interrupting a police officer in performance of an official duty).
68. Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
69. Id. at 572-73.
70. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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corporate treasuries in elections for state office. All nine justices
agreed that the compelling interest standard should be applied when
state laws imposed such a direct burden on political expression.
Writing for a majority that included both Brennan and Rehnquist,
Justice Marshall concluded that the state had met its burden of
showing that the challenged law was necessary to promote its com-
pelling interest in preventing distortions of the political process at-
tributable to the ability of corporations to amass funds unrelated to
public support for the organization's position.7 1 In separate dissent-
ing opinions, both Scalia and Kennedy (joined by O'Connor) at-
tacked the majority for endorsing censorship and argued that the
state had not shown a compelling justification for a direct restriction
on political expression.72 Whatever the outcome may say about the
justice's attitudes toward corporations in opposing coalitions, the
spectacle of three Reagan appointees attacking Brennan and Mar-
shall for lack of vigor in enforcing First Amendment rights surely
supports the conclusion that there is little debate within the Rehn-
quist Court about the general principle of applying strict scrutiny
where political speech is concerned.
Although the pattern of conservative justices dissenting from a
majority decision to uphold a law challenged on First Amendment
grounds was unique to the Austin case, coalitional conflict along lib-
eral/conservative lines appears to have been more pervasive in cases
in which the Rehnquist Court rejected freedom of speech, press, or
association claims than when the Court ruled in favor of litigants
asserting First Amendment rights. In Board of Directors Rotary In-
ternational v. Rotary Club of Duarte 7 the Court unanimously re-
jected a First Amendment freedom of association challenge to a Cali-
fornia law requiring Rotary Club chapters to admit women as
members. All participating justices except Scalia joined Blackmun's
opinion which declared that any infringement of Rotary members'
rights of expressive association was "justified because it serves the
State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women." 74 Otherwise, coalitional conflict was the norm when opin-
ions discussed levels of scrutiny and the Court rejected First Amend-
ment claims. While the standard of review invoked by shifting ma-
jorities varied from case to case, Justices Brennan and
Marshall-often joined by Blackmun and/or Stevens-were consis-
71. Id. at 659-60.
72. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 695 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
74. Id. at 549.
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tent in endorsing relatively stringent standards. In at least five cases,
the justices in opposing coalitions debated levels of scrutiny and dis-
agreed on the proper standard to be applied."0 In United States v.
Kokinda 6 Justice O'Connor applied a "reasonableness" standard to
uphold a Postal Service regulation prohibiting charitable solicitations
on a post office sidewalk. Three Reagan appointees and Justice
White agreed that the deferential standard was appropriate because
the sidewalk in question was not a public forum.7 Both Justice
Kennedy in a concurring opinion and Justice Brennan in dissent ar-
gued for a more demanding standard of review. Brennan criticized
the plurality's use of public forum analysis to uphold restrictions on
speech and favored application of the compelling interest standard
when government imposed content-based restrictions on expression
in a public forum.78 In Munro v. Socialist Workers Party79 the ma-
jority upheld a state law that generally had the effect of excluding
minor party candidates from the general election ballot. In the ma-
jority opinion Justice White appeared to apply a deferential reasona-
bleness standard.80 Criticizing the majority for failing to clearly ar-
ticulate the standard applied, Marshall and Brennan asserted that
prior cases unequivocally established a strict scrutiny test when a
statute burdened minor party access to the ballot."1
Coalitional conflict was particularly acute in three cases in
which a conservative majority argued that the special character of
schools or prisons mandated a deferential standard of review. In Ha-
zlewood School District v. Kuhlmeir, Justice White ruled that school
officials were entitled to regulate the content of school newspapers in
a manner "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.""2
Observing that school officials in this case had broken their promise
not to restrict free expression, Brennan (joined by Marshall and
Blackmun) argued for a less deferential standard based on Tinker v.
Des Moines School District.8" In Turner v. Safley8" a 5-4 majority
75. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); United States v. Kokinda,
110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990); Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See infra notes 76-87
and accompanying text.
76. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
77. Id. at 3120-22.
78. Id. at 3127, 3133 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
80. Id. at 195-96.
81. Id. at 200-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. at 273.
83. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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rejected strict scrutiny in the prison context and upheld Missouri
regulations restricting correspondence between inmates held in dif-
ferent prisons. Deferring to the expertise of prison officials, Justice
O'Connor found the challenged regulations "reasonably related to
legitimate security interests. '"85 Justice Stevens' dissent-joined by
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-showed little concern for stan-
dards of review in the abstract, but clearly imposed on prison offi-
cials seeking to restrict prisoners' "right to communicate" a burden
of justification akin to heightened scrutiny. 8' Similar conflict marked
the Court's decision in Thornburgh v. Abbott upholding federal
prison regulations allowing wardens to deny prisoners access to mag-
azine issues deemed threatening to prison security or discipline.
87
Justice Blackmun wrote for a six member majority applying the def-
erential standard of Turner v. Safley, while Stevens argued for an
intermediate level of scrutiny.
In other cases, coalitional conflict centered not on the standard
of review, but on its application. In both Frisby v. Schultz8 and
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,89 the majority applied a form of
heightened scrutiny, but ruled that local ordinances alleged to violate
the First Amendment were constitutional. In Frisby Justice
O'Connor concluded that a content-neutral ordinance prohibiting
picketing in front of a residence was "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest" in protecting the privacy of the
home90 and left open "ample alternative channels of communica-
tion."91 Although agreeing that the majority had articulated the ap-
propriate test, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens concluded that the
challenged ordinances did not meet the "narrowly tailored"
requirement.
92
In the commercial speech area, the Court's internal debate was
characterized by general agreement on the intermediate scrutiny
standard derived from Central Hudson, accompanied by disagree-
ment about its application. In Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox9"
85. Id. at 91 (1987). Using the same "reasonable relationship" standard, the Court did,
however, strike down on substantive due process grounds regulations imposing stringent re-
strictions on the right of prisoners to marry. Id. at 95-99.
86. Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 409 U.S. 401 (1989).
88. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
89. 409 U.S. 401 (1989).
90. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 484-88.
91. Id. at 489.
92. Id. at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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all nine justices joined opinions approving the Central Hudson
test.94 There was no dispute about the proposition that a restriction
on truthful commercial speech should be upheld only if it directly
advances a substantial governmental interest. Writing for a six-
member majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the final Central
Hudson requirement that a regulation must not be "more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest" should not be interpreted as
mandating a "least restrictive means" test. Instead, Scalia concluded,
a standard of "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest" would be appropriate in light of the "subordinate position
[of commercial speech] in the scale of First Amendment values." 95 In
dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Brennan and Marshall, criti-
cized the majority for "recasting" the language of earlier commercial
speech decisions, but avoided the "least restrictive means" issue by
arguing that the case should have been decided on overbreadth
grounds.96
There was, then, considerable conflict among the justices over
outcomes in freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association cases
during the first four years of the Rehnquist Court. Although coali-
tions were fluid, the justices more often than not split broadly along
liberal-conservative lines, particularly when a majority rejected First
Amendment claims. This conflictual pattern should not obscure fun-
damental points of agreement, however. A consensus emerged that
the compelling governmental interest standard was the norm when
direct restrictions on core political speech were challenged. More-
over, the debates among the justices were almost invariably framed
in terms of means-end scrutiny, and at least some of the justices
(often a majority) invariably called for applying a standard less def-
erential to governmental claims than rationality review when First
Amendment freedoms of expression or association were at issue.
II. FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
In the later years of the Warren Court and throughout the Bur-
ger Court, the use of strict scrutiny concepts and the compelling gov-
ernmental interest standard were staple features of the Court's free
exercise jurisprudence. 97 During the Rehnquist Court, some cases
94. See supra note 57.
95. Bd. of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477.
96. Id. at 3038 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 398 (1981); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). See Galloway, Basic Free Exercise Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L.
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confirmed the use of strict scrutiny when state laws allegedly violated
the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Ap-
plying Warren and Burger Court precedents, Brennan specifically
used the compelling interest test to strike down a state unemploy-
ment compensation agency's decision to deny benefits to an individ-
ual who was fired because she converted to a Sabbatarian religion
which prohibited Saturday work.98 Only Rehnquist dissented. In an-
other case, an individual who was not a member of a Sabbatarian
religion refused to work Sundays. Implicitly using heightened scru-
tiny, Justice White held that the state had the burden of proof to
justify any interference with religious belief. Since it had not done
so, the state could not deny him the benefits.99
Aside from the Sabbatarian cases, the Rehnquist Court exhib-
ited considerable conflict about the use of heightened scrutiny lan-
guage in free exercise cases. In contrast to the broad consensus and
fluid coalitions characterizing freedom of expression and association
cases, the splits in free exercise cases were substantially bipolar. Jus-
tices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy usually formed a coali-
tion to deny free exercise claims, using a deferential rationality stan-
dard. A coalition of Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun formed an
opposing group. O'Connor and Stevens stood between the two coali-
tions, but often voted to deny these claims.
The use of the less demanding reasonableness standard marked
the free exercise decisions of the Rehnquist-White-Scalia-Kennedy
coalition. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz'00 the Court explored
whether maximum security inmates in a New Jersey prison had the
right to demand attendance at Jumu'ah, an Islamic congregational
service, under the free exercise clause. Prison officials had banned
their attendance because it violated rules on prison security that re-
stricted maximum security inmates from less secure areas of the
prison and from contact with certain other prisoners. Rehnquist, ad-
hering to his previous use of a deferential standard when evaluating
the rights of prisoners, denied the free exercise claim. His argument
was straight forward. Previous cases had established that incarcera-
tion partially limited prisoners' privileges and rights. The Court had
deferred to prison officials who acted in a reasonable manner to se-
cure and safely administer prisons in past cases.'" In this case the
REV. 865, 873-76 (1989).
98. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 140-42 (1981).
99. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1987).
100. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
101. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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prison administrators had a series of reasonable concerns about
prison security and management if maximum security prisoners at-
tended Jumu'ah. Finally, the maximum security prisoners had alter-
native means of religious expression. Therefore, the Chief Justice
concluded that the restriction on religious expression was reasona-
ble.102 Brennan's dissent, joined by Marshall, Blackmun and Ste-
vens, began by attacking th use of the reasonableness standard in
Rehnquist Court free exercise cases. Brennan argued that the Court
should have adopted an approach to prisoners' rights like that devel-
oped by Court of Appeals Judge Irving Kaufman. 03 The approach
suggested by Kaufman would permit the use of a reasonableness
standard when a prisoner seeks to engage in a presumptively danger-
ous activity or when a prison regulation controls only the time, place,
or manner of expression. However, in cases like Estate of Shabazz
where the activity is not presumptively dangerous and where the
prisoner has been completely denied the exercise of the right, the
government must show that the policy is necessary to achieve an im-
portant governmental objective."0 4 Brennan could not locate in the
"assertions" of possible security problems offered by the prison ad-
ministration a state interest of sufficient importance to justify the de-
nial of religious exercise in this case.
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Ass'n'0 5 employed strict scrutiny language, but in a way
that varied from the free exercise cases about employment practices.
At issue was a Forest Service plan to build roads and permit timber
harvesting in areas of a national forest traditionally used for reli-
gious services by Native Americans. Relying on Bowen v. Roy,'06
where the Burger Court held it constitutional to require a person to
use a Social Security number in transactions with the government
despite free exercise objections, O'Connor sustained the Forest Ser-
vice plan. She held that the road building and timber harvesting did
not coerce the Native Americans into violating their religious beliefs
nor "penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal
share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citi-
zens."' 07 Further, she contended that this holding fit with the con-
102. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 350-52.
103. Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 745 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985).
104. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
105. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
106. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
107. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. at 449.
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cept of strict scrutiny used in prior free exercise cases.1" 8
Thus, O'Connor confined strict scrutiny to situations when the
government engaged in coercion, as she contends occurred in the un-
employment compensation-free exercise cases like Hobbie and Fra-
zee. Yet, her effort to distinguish the cases failed to clarify why the
state practices in the unemployment compensation cases were coer-
cive and not merely inhibitory or frustrating. In Northwest Indian
Cemetery, however, she simply concluded that the frustration or inhi-
bition of religious practice was minimal and served reasonable gov-
ernmental objectives.1 09 Brennan's dissenting opinion in this case,
joined by Marshall and Blackmun, rejected O'Connor's restriction of
violations of the Free Exercise clause to situations involving direct
coercion. He contended that, "the constitutional guarantee we inter-
pret today ...draws no such fine distinctions between types of re-
straints on religious exercise, but rather is directed against any form
of governmental action that frustrates or inhibits religious prac-
tice."' 0 Much of Brennan's opinion discussed the evidence of a bur-
den on free exercise. Brennan argued that precedent indicated once
the Native Americans had shown a risk to their religious practices
existed, the government had to show a compelling interest to build a
road and harvest timber on the land subject to religious practice.
From the evidence he concluded that the government had not met its
burden of justification."'
No case of the first four years of the Rehnquist Court better
illustrates coalitional conflict on free exercise issues than Employ-
ment Division v. Smith." 2 At issue was whether the free exercise
clause protected the use of the mild hallucinogen peyote as part of a
religious ceremony by a member of the Native American Church.
Church members Alfred Smith and Galen Black had been fired from
positions as counselors in a drug rehabilitation program after admit-
ting the religious use of peyote. Thereafter, an official of the state
unemployment compensation agency determined that peyote use was
108. O'Conner stated:
This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs,
which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but have no ten-
dency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require
government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful
actions. The crucial word in the constitutional text is "prohibit".
Id. at 450.
109. Id. at 451-53.
110. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 474-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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"misconduct" which, according to a state statute, required a determi-
nation of ineligibility for unemployment compensation. After exten-
sive preliminary litigation, the Oregon Supreme Court had deter-
mined the free exercise clause exempted peyote use by members of
the Church from prosecution under Oregon laws against possession
and use of controlled substances. " ' Scalia's majority opinion essen-
tially exempted state laws prohibiting drug use for religious purposes
from strict scrutiny and the compelling state interest standard under
the free exercise clause.
Scalia began by discussing precedents in which the free exercise
clause was used to protect categories of religious belief, profession of
belief, and performance or abstinence from physical acts. He then
distinguished the precedents from his position that drug use as part
of a religious ceremony could not excuse violations of a neutral, gen-
erally applicable criminal law not specifically directed at a religious
practice. He concluded that precedents held that physical acts per-
formed for religious reasons, like peyote consumption, could be regu-
lated by laws not specifically designed to prohibit a religious
practice."'
Scalia further argued the Court had made exceptions to this
principle only when a neutral, generally applicable law involved free
exercise in conjunction with freedom of speech or freedom of the
press. Except for these "hybrid" situations, he made it clear that the
breadth of the free exercise guarantee could be fixed by statutes
designed to prohibit socially harmful conduct. 115 The legislature
could define socially harmful conduct unless it singled out the con-
duct of a specific religious association for criminal penalization.
Further limiting the content of free exercise, Scalia refused to
extend the holdings of Sherbert v. Verner and other unemployment
compensation cases in which strict scrutiny was employed to Smith's
case, citing the decisions in Bowen v. Roy, Estate of Shabazz, and
Northwest Indian Cemetery. Unlike O'Connor's attempt to distin-
guish the incidental harm of road building to free exercise in North-
west Indian Cemetery from the constitutionally harmful "coercive"
113. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (1986); Black v. Employment Div., 721
P.2d 451 (1986); Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (remand to Oregon Su-
preme Court to determine if religious use of peyote was legal in Oregon); Smith v. Employ-
ment Div., 763 P.2d 146 (1988).
114. According to Scalia, "[w]e have never held that an individual's religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is
free to regulate." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
115. Id. at 881-82.
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actions in Hobbie and Frazee, Scalia distinguished the free exercise
cases demanding strict scrutiny analysis from those which demanded
only the use of the reasonableness criteria in a different way. The
compelling governmental interest test, he held, was inapplicable to
challenges that did not require an examination of individual circum-
stances (as in the unemployment compensation cases). In contrast,
the application of "across-the-board criminal prohibitions on a par-
ticular form of conduct" cannot be exempted because of free exercise
claims.' 16 The result is that the compelling interest test does not ap-
ply to free exercise of religion claims when general criminal laws
curtail practices that an individual or religious association contends
are religiously commanded.
Scalia presented two reasons for the Court's refusal to protect
Smith's religious exercise, .one based on "constitutional tradition"
and one on "common sense."" 7 In his constitutional tradition argu-
ment, Scalia stated that Smith's claim was not comparable to those
race and speech cases in which strict scrutiny and the compelling
interest test had been applied in the past. "What it [the test] pro-
duces in those other fields-equality of treatment, and an un-
restricted flow of contending speech-are constitutional norms; what
it would produce here-a private right to ignore generally applicable
laws-is a constitutional anomaly.""' 8
His common sense argument contended that to allow exemp-
tions under a compelling interest test would cause "the prospect of
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations
of almost every conceivable kind." The result would be "courting
anarchy." '' Illustrating his position with a series of examples of the
dangers of the use of the compelling interest standard, he also
claimed it would force judges into the constitutionally unsound prac-
tice of deciding if a religious practice was so central to a faith that
governments had no compelling interest to regulate it." 0 Instead, he
concluded, it is better to leave some religious practices relatively dis-
advantaged than to leave religions to become a law unto themselves
or subject to the consideration of the merits of their beliefs by
judges.' Smith might well mark the beginning of a direct effort by
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and White to reduce the categories of
116. Id. at 882-85.
117. Id. at 885.
118. Id. at 886.
119. Id. at 888.
120. Id. at 886-89.
121. Id. at 890.
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claims deserving higher-tier strict scrutiny/compelling interest analy-
sis. In any event, it certainly marks the extension of reasonableness
discourse in a new fashion as the scope of strict scrutiny is confined
to a select set of free exercise cases.122
Whereas Scalia attempted to distinguish in general terms the
free exercise cases demanding strict scrutiny analysis from those
which he found only required the use of the deferential reasonable-
ness standard, O'Connor in a concurring opinion took a more mod-
erate tack. She attempted to distinguish the road building in North-
west Indian Cemetery from the "coercive" government actions in
cases like Hobbie and Frazee. She contended that settled doctrine
dating from Carolene Products" ' had required strict scrutiny in free
exercise cases. Although her Northwest Indian Cemetery opinion in-
dicated a desire to limit the types of governmental activity subjected
to strict scrutiny under the free exercise clause, in Smith she stated
that, "Recent cases have instead reaffirmed that [compelling interest]
test as a fundamental part of our First Amendment doctrine," and
"The cases cited by the Court signal no retreat from our consistent
adherence to the compelling interest test."" 4 Despite loyalty to the
strict scrutiny concept, she upheld the ban on peyote consumption.
She found that the ban was needed to further the state's compelling
interest in reducing the harms of drug use and drug trafficking.1 26
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with O'Connor's jus-
tifications for the use of the compelling state interest test, but dis-
sented from her assessment of the harm of peyote use. Blackmun
wrote that the state had simply not provided enough solid documen-
tary evidence about the harms of peyote use to prove a compelling
interest.126 Blackmun also criticized Scalia's assumption that requir-
ing an exception to the criminal law to permit peyote consumption
as part of a religious observance would oblige a host of other exemp-
tions to the criminal law. Calling such an argument "speculative,"
he maintained the courts still should be able to distinguish sincere
religious belief from false claims that might endanger public health
122. Thus, this case extends the kinds of free exercise claims held to be exempt from
strict scrutiny and subject to rationality review. Previously, exemption from strict scrutiny had
been limited to the special contexts of prisons, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342(1987), and the military, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1987). See Galloway, supra
note 97, at 876-77.
123. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
124. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 900 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 905-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 909-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and safety or promote drug trafficking.1"1
Although the compelling interest test has generally led to the
conclusion that a challenged statute violates the Constitution, the test
has also been used to uphold government action, particularly in free
exercise cases.1"' During the first four years of the Rehnquist Court,
Brennan and Marshall generally used this standard to defend reli-
gious minorities, but they also used it to reject a free exercise claim
in a federal tax case. 12' Marshall's majority opinion upheld denial of
tax deductions for selected auditing and training services provided by
the Church of Scientology, rejecting establishment clause130 and free
exercise claims. Marshall concluded that the denial of the tax deduc-
tions only slightly burdened the individual. Using strict scrutiny
principles, he found that administration of a sound tax system consti-
tuted a compelling governmental interest, and that the claimed ex-
emption neither stemmed from a doctrinal obligation nor prevented
the fulfillment of a religious duty."3 ' O'Conner's dissenting opinion
did not address the free exercise issue.
In another taxation case, Brennan wrote a majority opinion
striking down an exemption from state sales tax afforded religious
publishers on establishment clause grounds."" Addressing free exer-
cise claims as well, Brennan noted that no claim of an interference
with free exercise had been argued by a religious organization, and,
in any case, he did not find the act creating a precondition that pre-
vented people from observing their religious tenets. Applying a bal-
ancing test from United States v. Lee,' he found that the sales tax
did not prevent the publisher's religious activity or the observation of
religious tenets, offered "little danger" of subjecting the religious
publication to undue burdens damaging its missionary activity, and
was not a covert attempt to curtail religious exercise.' 34 The other
opinions in this case once again did not address the free exercise
127. Id. at 916-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. Galloway, supra note 97, at 874-75.
129. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
130. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
131. 490 U.S. at 698-700.
132. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). See infra notes 155-60 and
accompanying text.
133. 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1984).
134. 489 U.S. 1, 24-25. Brennan rejected some of the sweeping language in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106-14, (1943) and Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S.
573, 575-77 (1944), that had implied that the free exercise clause required a ban on the taxa-
tion of any religious practices. In these cases the Court held that the clause prohibited any flat




issue. In a final taxation case with free exercise dimensions,
O'Connor for a unanimous court rejected expansive readings of the
free exercise clause precedents and upheld a California law imposing
state sales and use taxes on retail sales of religious merchandise by
an out-of-state religious organization.18" Since the tax.was not on the
* right to disseminate religious ideas or beliefs but on retail sales of
property and the storage and consumption of personal property, it
did not burden the free exercise of sincere religious beliefs. Any de-
crease in the money available for religious activity, any detriment to
the dissemination of religious ideas, information, or beliefs, and any
violation of the sincere religious beliefs of the Ministry members was
deemed constitutionally insignificant.1 6 O'Connor did not use the
heightened scrutiny language in this case, but these taxation cases
make clear that not all statutes giving rise to free exercise claims will
be subjected to strict scrutiny and struck down.
IV. RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT CLAIMS
In contrast to freedom of expression and free exercise cases,
claims that governmental action violates the establishment clause of
the First Amendment generally have not involved explicit invocation
of the language of strict scrutiny or the compelling governmental in-
terest test. Rather, most Rehnquist Court cases under the establish-
ment clause have applied the three-prong test of Lemon v. Kurtz-
man 137 or variations on the Lemon theme, such as Justice
O'Connor's position that what the Constitution prohibits is govern-
mental "endorsement" of religion. 8 Still, there are parallels be-
tween establishment clause cases and those raising other First
Amendment claims because Lemon employed language suggesting an
intensified means-ends scrutiny that closely parallels strict scru-
tiny. 9 Each part of the Lemon test seems to put the burden of justi-
fication on government: First, the statute must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose; second its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster an "excessive governmental entanglement with religion."140
135. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board. of Equalization of Calif., 493 U.S. 378
(1990).
136. Id. at 389-92.
137. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
138. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 845, 846, 851-53 (1989); Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny, supra note 19, at 453.
140. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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Chief Justice Burger's Lemon opinion also called for "close
scrutiny" of the "degree of entanglement" involved in the relation-
ship between state government and religious institutions. 41 In short,
Lemon invites but does not necessarily compel an approach to stan-
dards of review and burdens of proof directly parallel to strict
scrutiny.
Establishment clause cases also differ from other First Amend-
ment cases in that there is less agreement among the justices on basic
principles, leading to less stable coalitions than in freedom of expres-
sion or free exercise areas. The differences among the justices in es-
tablishment clause cases tend to relate directly to burden of proof
questions, most frequently whether the evidence presented supports
the conclusion that the challenged law has violated one or more of
the prongs of the Lemon test. During the first four years of the
Rehnquist Court era, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
usually formed a coalition that interpreted the Lemon test to demand
a form of intensified scrutiny that put the burden on the state to
produce evidence that a challenged governmental practice did not
provide support for religion. Taking almost any legislative efforts on
behalf of religion as indicative of a religious establishment, they re-
quired the state to provide very strong (or what we might call "com-
pelling") evidence that the prongs of the Lemon test were not vio-
lated. In contrast to this "separationist" discourse about the meaning
of the establishment clause,14 Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy sup-
ported efforts by government to accommodate the interests of reli-
gious bodies against the separationist position. What we will call
their "accommodationist" argument read Lemon as demanding less
intensified scrutiny than the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun bloc. In
their view, governments could accommodate some religious activities
if some evidence indicated that it was reasonable for the government
to benefit religious organizations. This "rationality review" was nor-
mally deferential to governmental policies unless governmental coer-
cion in support of a religion was shown. Applying this deferential
approach, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist invariably
opposed the "separationist" position, and Justice Scalia supported
separation in only one case.143 Justices White, O'Connor, and Ste-
vens voiced more idiosyncratic approaches to establishment disputes.
141. Id. at 614.
142. FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION 7-9 (1976); Kobylka, supra note
10, at 549.
143. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
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In Edwards v. Aguillard1'" Brennan's opinion for the Court
held that the purpose of Louisiana's "Creation Science Act" was re-
ligious and violated the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test.
Brennan's analysis centered on his consideration of statements indi-
cating the legislature's intent in passing the Act. Although the review
of the evidence of legislative intent was brief and focused on the
statements of the Act's sponsor, it allowed him to conclude that the
legislature intended "to restructure the science curriculum to con-
form with a particular religious viewpoint."'1 4 5
In dissent, Rehnquist and Scalia adopted a very deferential rea-
sonableness standard for the review of evidence about the secular
purpose criterion of Lemon. Much of Scalia's opinion is devoted to
arguing that the Court's majority misread the Louisiana legislature's
intent. Taking the position that the majority justices ignored the
plain meaning of statutory language indicating a secular purpose for
the law, he concluded that the legislative history did not provide
strong enough evidence to find a violation of the first prong of the
Lemon standard." Especially in the final sections of his opinion,
Scalia also criticized the secular purpose standard itself, urging a
deferential posture for the Court.1 47 Clearly, he was unwilling to
strike down a law he found to be a reasonable effort to include a
theory with religious origins in a public school curriculum.
Rehnquist, in Bowen v. Kendrick"" applied Lemon directly to
evaluate the constitutionality of the Adolescent and Family Life Act
provisions on grants to religious organizations for the operation of
programs under the statute. 49 His comparison of evidence to the
Lemon prongs concentrated on defining how the statutory language
satisfied the Lemon criteria. He read the statutory language to be
facially neutral and the statute to be constructed so as to prevent
assistance to "pervasively sectarian" organizations.' The opinion
thus viewed the law as providing, by using organizations with some
connections to religious bodies, a neutral, reasonable means of pro-
viding child and family services. He failed to consider any evidence
of the law's intent in regard to religious bodies, the message about
religion that it communicated, or the implications of the indirect en-
144. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
145. Id. at 593.
146. Id. at 610-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147., Id. at 626, 636-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
149. Id. at 602.
150. Id. at 610.
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tanglement or possible future entanglement that it might engender.
Also, Kennedy, joined by Scalia, offered a brief concurring opinion
to stress that the facial neutrality of the Act between grantee institu-
tions that were not pervasively sectarian should be the only object of
inquiry. 15' They would limit evidence about unreasonable govern-
mental activity and make it impossible to scrutinize governmental
practices closely in establishment cases.
In Bowen v. Kendrick, Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion,
which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. The opinion centered
on two issues: the majority's definitions of sectarian institutions and
its application of Lemon. First, Blackmun argued that the majority
used a narrow, "pervasively sectarian" definition of the kinds of in-
stitutions that could not receive federal aid. This definition, he con-
tended, prevented the consideration of evidence about the institution
and the use of aid. 15 ' Even so, under statute's terms he found funds
could go to pervasively sectarian institutions, thus creating a substan-
tial risk of promotion of religion contrary to Lemon.1 53 Second, he
concluded that the evidence showed a violation of the entanglement
prong. Because the statute provided money to some pervasively secta-
rian institutions, the government had to engage in intrusive inspec-
tion that had an entangling character in order to track the use of the
money and prevent the subsidization of religion." 4 In short, there
was "compelling" evidence of an establishment clause violation.
Writing for the Court in Texas Monthly v. Bullock,' Brennan
struck down a Texas law exempting religious publications from the
state sales tax. Using all prongs of Lemon to guide his establishment
clause analysis, Brennan held that the exemption lacked a secular
purpose and had the effect of advancing religion by giving it prefer-
ential treatment unrelated to a legitimate secular end.'5 Also, he
held that the exemption produced greater entanglement than its de-
nial because the state would be forced to evaluate whether a publica-
tion qualified for the exemption rather than just collect the tax from
the publication.' 57 In short, he found compelling evidence that the
exemption amounted to governmental sponsorship of religion. In
Texas Monthly, Justice Scalia, joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy,
151. Id. at 624 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 630-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 648 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 649-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
156. Id. at 18.
157. Id. at 20.
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dissented in an effort to defend the constitutionality of exempting
religious materials from sales taxation. The establishment clause ar-
gument again applied Lemon in a conscious effort to accommodate
religious practices. Scalia argued that the law had a secular legisla-
tive purpose in its effort to accommodate, rather than to promote or
endorse, a religious practice.' 58 Further, he contended that the law
did not subsidize a religion and that its primary effect was not to
divert public or private monies to religious bodies.' 59 He regarded
the government's collection of the tax, required by the majority opin-
ion, to be an entanglement greater than any decision about whether
a publication was secular or religious, as required by the statute.
Scalia thus offered an opinion that is deferential to governmental
claims and used a discourse claiming the Court's majority was hos-
tile to a law expressing popular values and traditions regarding
religion.160
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,' the Court offered five
opinions generating a confusing pattern of coalitions about whether
the display of a creche inside and a menorah outside public buildings
in Pittsburgh violated the establishment clause. Blackmun wrote the
plurality opinion, and Brennan supplied a concurring and dissenting
opinion, joined by Marshall and Stevens. For the Court, Blackmun
upheld the constitutionality of the display of the menorah but not the
creche. Brennan found both displays violative of the establishment
clause.
Blackmun used Lemon as the basis of his analysis, but his opin-
ion also drew on the "endorsement of religion" standard voiced by
O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly.'62 He considered the O'Connor
concurrence to provide "a sound analytical framework for evaluating
governmental use of religious symbols"' 3 that the Court's opinion in
Lynch lacked. Blackmun concluded from the evidence that the nature
of the creche display endorsed Christian doctrine and thus created a
prima facie violation of the establishment clause.' 4 Although Black-
mun did not directly assign a burden of proof, his opinion clearly
assumes that the County bore the burden of proving a lack of en-
dorsement of religion. Unpersuaded by the County's argument,
158. Id. at 40-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 42-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 43-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
162. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989).
164. Id. at 601-02.
19921 1077
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Blackmun found compelling evidence of endorsement in the location
of the creche and the distinctively nonsecular nature of its exhibi-
tion." 6 He then argued that the establishment clause required strict
scrutiny of any governmental practice that indicated a "denomina-
tional preference." 1 6 With regard to the menorah, he concluded that
the association of its display with secular holiday symbols like a
large Christmas tree diminished the possibility that it would be
taken as an endorsement of Judaism.16 7
Brennan's concurring and dissenting opinion in this case fo-
cused on the display of the menorah. He contended that Blackmun's
discussion of both the Christmas tree and the context of the display
of the menorah was an effort to transform religious into holiday
symbols. Also, he argued, although the display presented the symbols
of two religions and contained a sign evidencing concern for religious
pluralism in the community as an element of American liberty, it
still was a promotion of religion that could not survive his implied
strict scrutiny approach to government polices alleged to violate the
establishment clause. 68
In the Allegheny County case Kennedy wrote an opinion, joined
by Rehnquist, White, and Scalia, arguing for the constitutionality of
both displays. Kennedy considered the only issue in the case to be
the validity of the displays under the principal effects prong of
Lemon. His argument rested on a review of evidence finding that the
neither the creche nor the menorah was "coercive" in its principal
effects. By coercive effects Kennedy meant that neither display pro-
vided tangible benefits to a religion by compelling religious actions,
interfering with a religious practice, forcing persons to support a re-
ligion, or establishing the symbols of a religion so obtrusively that
the government appeared obviously to be engaging in religious
proselytization. He found these displays were only a reasonable sym-
bolic recognition or passive acknowledgement by government of the
religious aspects of a holiday with both secular and religious compo-
nents. He deemed it unrealistic to regard the displays as an effort to
establish a religion."' The thrust of his formulation of a "coercion"
criterion was not only to construct a new substandard in establish-
ment clause jurisprudence, but also to require critics of the display to
bear the burden of showing harmful or coercive effects. In contrast to
165. Id. at 599-600.
166. Id. at 609.
167. Id. at 613-21.
168. Id. at 637-46 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
169. Id. at 655-67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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other applications of the Lemon standards, Kennedy's approach
would relieve the government of justifying its accommodationist im-
pulses, thus suggesting a deferential posture similar to review under
a rational basis standard.
Although Justices Brennan, Marshall, and, often, Blackmun
applied a "compelling evidence" criterion and voted to strike down
statutes affecting religions, sometimes they found adequate evidence
of a compelling reason for the statute or for unique treatment of the
statute. Despite claims of establishment, they legitimated some taxa-
tion, educational, and employment practices against contentions of
establishment through an examination of evidence under the Lemon
criteria. Marshall's opinion for the Court in a federal tax case up-
held a denial of income tax deductions sought by members of the
Church of Scientology.'7 ° Using Lemon, he held that distinctions in
federal tax law between permissible deductions for gifts to religions
and nondeductible fees for tangible products and services were con-
stitutional. The deduction rules did not prefer one religion over
others, advance or inhibit religion, or excessively entangle church
and state. 7 These justices also supported taxation of the profit-
making activities of a religious organization by voting for Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization of California.'17
Marshall and Brennan also joined the majority in upholding
the provisions of the federal Equal Access Act that permitted a reli-
gious organization called the Christian Club to meet in a public
school. 17 However, Marshall's opinion urged that the school admin-
istration must take affirmative steps to dissociate the school and its
personnel from the Club and to disclaim any. intimation of endorse-
ment of the Club's religious goals.174 Kennedy's concurring opinion
with Scalia in this case furthered his promotion of the coercion con-
cept. He argued that the school merely recognized the Christian
Club, and that there was no coercion by school officials for students
to associate with or participate in the activities of the club. The pri-
mary effect of the law allowing the Club, therefore, was not to co-
erce religious behavior.175 Also, the opinion attacked O'Connor's use
of an "endorsement" criterion to evaluate, under the second prong of
170. Commissioner v. Hernandez, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
171. Id. at 695-96.
172. 493 U.S. 378 (1989).
173. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
174. Id. at 2382 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
175. Id. at 2376-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Lemon, the principal effects of a policy. 176 Although Kennedy also
offered this criticism in the creche-menorah case, 177 its assertion in
Mergens illustrated the lack of coalitional behavior among Ronald
Reagan's appointees on establishment issues.
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,17' the Court
considered whether a church-owned corporation could discriminate
on the basis of religion when hiring or firing persons from jobs that
did not involve the propagation of the religion. Provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 had exempted religious organizations from
bans on job discrimination, but the appellee argued that the provi-
sion had the effect of benefitting religious employers, thus running
afoul of the second (principal effects) prong of Lemon and violating
the establishment clause. The Court, in an opinion by White, re-
jected this argument. After beginning with an explicit acceptance of
the constitutionality of accommodation of religious practices by gov-
ernment,1 79 White then applied the Lemon test to uphold the Act
allowing a religious organization to use religion as a criterion for
firing an employee. 80 He concluded that the law had a secular pur-
pose of preventing governmental interference in a religion, that its
effects did not advance the proselytization of the religion, and that it
worked to avoid potential entanglements. He then noted that the law
was "rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating signif-
icant governmental interference with ... religious missions." ' " This
rationality language clearly indicates that he did not conceive of
Lemon as imposing the equivalent of a compelling interest standard
and requiring government to provide evidence justifying its efforts to
accommodate religious practices. Brennan's concurring opinion,
joined by Marshall, avoided the use of the language of scrutiny. In-
stead, Brennan sought to create a categorical exemption from strict
scrutiny for the nonprofit activities of religious organizations. The
use of such an automatic rule, he argued, would avoid any entangle-
ment of the courts in the operations of the religious body and would
keep the courts from chilling the free exercise of religion by the or-
ganization.1 82 Justice O'Connor, who had developed her own inter-
176. Id. at 2377-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
179. Id. at 334.
180. Id. at 335-37.
181. Id. at 339.
182. Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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pretation of the Lemon standards,18 restated her desire to inquire
into whether the governmental action is an "endorsement" of a reli-
gion. 84 The endorsement standard would minimize inquiry into evi-
dence about legislative purposes and focus instead on the nature of
the message communicated by governmental action ("endorsement")
rather than speculation about the principal effects of the action. As it
emerged, O'Connor's endorsement criterion did not shift the burden
of proof away from the government when establishment clause viola-
tions were at issue. However, it did limit the introduction of evidence
to whether there was an endorsement message in a governmental
policy. Evidence about the other effects of a policy, like citizen be-
havior, was to be excluded from consideration. In this case she found
that the civil rights law provision allowing a religious organization to
fire an employee because of religious considerations was not a mes-
sage of endorsement of a religious principle or practice by
government.
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Bowen v. Kendrick8 ' reiter-
ated that she would use the endorsement criterion to gauge the prin-
cipal effect of the Adolescent and Family Life Act granting proce-
dures. She concluded that the grants to religious organizations under
the Act did not constitute a message of endorsement. Her concurring
opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Pittsburgh holiday dis-
play case was largely an exchange with Justice Kennedy over the
relative value of the endorsement and the coercion criteria. She con-
tended that the endorsement test was not inconsistent and did not
manifest a hostility toward religion, especially since she found no
endorsement of religion when she applied it to the menorah display
issue.1 '
The force of O'Connor's position won converts. Blackmun used
the terminology of endorsement in two of his opinions,"' moving
away from the approach of Brennan and Marshall. In Board of Ed-
ucation v. Mergens,88 O'Connor's opinion for the Court used her
endorsement reading of the principal effects prong of Lemon. Here
she concluded that the recognition of the Christian Club by school
183. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
184. Corporate Pres. Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
185. 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 627-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
187. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 593; Corp. Pres. Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. at 346 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
188. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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officials as required by the Equal Access Act was not an endorse-
ment of the Club's views, nor was a message of endorsement commu-
nicated to students. She also upheld the constitutionality of the Club
under the secular purpose and entanglement prongs of Lemon.'89 In-
terestingly, the concurring opinion by Marshall used the terminology
of endorsement, even as it sought to broaden the kind of evidence
admissible to show endorsement.'
In another case with establishment contours, O'Connor wrote
the unanimous opinion of the Court, as in the Swaggart case. In
considering the establishment clause aspects of the taxation of the
sales of retail goods by Jimmy Swaggart's religious organization, she
avoided the endorsement issue related to the first two prongs of
Lemon in concluding that there was no entanglement of the state in
religion in a manner violative of these standards. 91 However, in
Hernandez her dissenting opinion, joined by Scalia, argued that de-
nial of the Church of Scientology members' tax deduction violated
the idea of neutral treatment of religious practices by government.' 92
She did not refer to the Lemon test and her endorsement criterion in
this dissent. Finally, her votes provided support for the separationist
position in the Creation Science case and in Texas Monthly."
Justice White often chose to follow an independent path in es-
tablishment clause cases. In the Louisiana Creation Science case,
Justice White concurred with the separationist result. However, un-
like Brennan's majority opinion which independently explored the
legislature's intent, White relied on lower court determinations of
legislative purpose and concluded that the act violated the first prong
of Lemon. In Texas Monthly, White's concurring opinion indicated
he would have avoided the establishment issue by finding the differ-
ential sales taxation policy to be a denial of freedom of the press.
With the exception of these two opinions, White was likely to defer
to governmental accommodations of religion. Through his opinion in
Presiding Bishop and his votes in Bowen v. Kendrick, the creche-
menorah case, Hernandez, and Mergens, White contributed to the
accommodationist outcomes of these decisions.
Justice Stevens pursued a different interpretative track. In his
opinion in County of Allegheny, he refused to differentiate between
189. Id. at 248-53.
190. Id. at 263 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
191. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 397 (1990).
192. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 712 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




the constitutionality of the displays of the creche and menorah. Ste-
vens' standards for the review of evidence did not rest on the Lemon
test or its variants. Instead, he contended that the establishment
clause contained a strong presumption against any display of reli-
gious symbols on public property. Further, the meaning of the sym-
bols could not be diminished by the presence of secular symbols or
by the symbols of other religions. 9' His dissenting opinion in
Mergens considered the issue as primarily one of freedom of expres-
sion. His establishment clause comments in the case were largely di-
rected at chastising Congress for forcing the Court to consider reli-
gion in the schools, not at any position voiced by the other justices. 9
He voted for separationist positions in the Creation Science case,
Kendrick,and Texas Monthly, but he voted for the accommodationist
position in Presiding Bishop, Hernandez, and Swaggart.
As is illustrated by this review of opinions, no pattern of inten-
sified scrutiny discourse and evidentiary analysis dominated the
Rehnquist Court's consideration of establishment clause cases. Only
Brennan and Marshall consistently supported standards for the eval-
uation of evidence akin to the strict scrutiny standard applied in
other First Amendment cases. On the other hand, Kennedy, Scalia,
and Rehnquist pursed an approach to establishment clause cases that
came close to converting the Lemon test to a variant of rationality
review. To clarify the underlying principles of Lemon, O'Connor
formulated her own "endorsement" test, a standard that in practice
often resulted in upholding government actions with religious links.
Although White tended to support the Rehnquist-Kennedy-Scalia
coalition in most cases and Blackmun and Stevens leaned toward
Brennan-Marshall position, all three appeared somewhat unsettled
about the standard of evidentiary review in their decisions.
V. RACIAL EQUALITY AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
THE striking thing about the racial equal protection discourse
of the Rehnquist Court is that all justices used intensified scrutiny
language, but differed over the precise standard to be applied and
the application of standards. Although multiple and shifting coali-
tions marked the handful of racial equal protection decisions during
the first four years of the Rehnquist Court, there was a general pat-
tern to the justices' internal divisions. Brennan, Marshall, and
194. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 650-55 (1989) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
195. Board of Education v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2383 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Blackmun consistently applied heightened scrutiny language in ways
that gave wide latitude to courts and legislative bodies that sought to
overcome the effects of past discrimination through affirmative action
plans and programs. Meanwhile, several other justices-including
the four Reagan appointees-supported a stringent version of the
strict scrutiny standard that would prohibit or severely restrict the
use of race-conscious remedial plans. Much of the debate focused on
questions of evidence, particularly the nature of evidence of past dis-
crimination that would be required to justify a race-conscious reme-
dial program. Similar patterns of coalition formation and evidentiary
debates also marked the more numerous statutory decisions bearing
on questions of equality.196
During its first four terms, the Rehnquist Court issued four im-
portant sets of opinions about standards of review and racial equal-
ity, three in affirmative action cases 97 and one in an equal protec-
tion challenge to the operation of Georgia's capital punishment
statutes.196 The first set appeared in United States v. Paradise,
where a white trooper challenged a court-ordered remedial proce-
dure for the promotion of Alabama state troopers which gave prefer-
ence to black officers until approximately 25 percent of a rank was
composed of black troopers. Brennan, joined by Powell, Marshall,
and Blackmun, upheld the remedial plan. Without committing him-
self to strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases, Brennan concluded
that the preferential remedy satisfied the compelling governmental
interest test applied in some earlier affirmative action opinions.1 99
Referring explicitly to the Court's ongoing debate over standards of
review, Brennan declared:
[A]lthough this Court has consistently held that some level of
elevated scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction
is to be made for remedial purposes, it has yet to reach consen-
sus on the appropriate constitutional analysis. We need not do
so in this case, however, because we conclude that the relief or-
dered survives even strict scrutiny analysis: it is "narrowly tai-
lored" to serve a "compelling [governmental] purpose. 200
196. See infra note 249.
197. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
198. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
199. Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 480 (1976); Id. at 484-85 (Powell,
J., concurring in judgment); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)
(Opinion of Powell, J.); University of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)
(Opinion of Powell, J.).
200. Paradise, 480 U.S.'at 166-67. Brennan had used similar language in upholding
1084 [Vol. 32
STRICT SCRUTINY
Brennan justified his conclusion about the existence of a com-
pelling governmental interest by reciting the record of state hostility
to the hiring and promotion of black troopers. " 1 Further, he argued
that precedent required the consideration of four factors to establish
that the remedial promotion plan was narrowly tailored to address
the discriminatory nature and effects of past hiring and promotion
practices. The four factors were the "necessity for the relief and the
efficacy of alternative plans," "the flexibility and duration of the re-
lief," the relationship of the numerical goals of the plan to the rele-
vant labor market, and "the impact of the relief on the rights of third
parties." After a review of the evidence, Brennan concluded that
the plan was the only reasonable remedy, was not an inflexible
quota and had a defined end-point, reflected a careful consideration
of labor markets by the District Court, and was temporary and did
not result in disproportionate harm to the interests of white troop-
ers.208 Thus, the plan was narrowly tailored. 0 4
Powell wrote a concurring opinion that also used the strict scru-
tiny and compelling interest language, but added a fifth factor to the
consideration of whether the plan was narrowly tailored, the "avail-
ability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met." 5
He found that this as well as the other four factors were satisfied by
the District Court's plan. Stevens' concurring opinion supported the
"broad and flexible authority" of the District Court to issue the rem-
edies. He did not employ the language of narrow tailoring and its
concomitant "factors" criteria.206
O'Connor, joined in dissent by Rehnquist, Scalia, and, in part,
by White, also adopted strict scrutiny, but she contended that "the
Court adopts a standardless view of 'narrowly tailored' far less strin-
against a constitutional challenge a federal court order imposing an affirmative action plan on
a union with a long history of racial discrimination. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 480
(Opinion of Brennan, J.). By applying the strict scrutiny standard that Powell had consistently
advocated in earlier opinions, Brennan was able to gain Powell's support for the plurality
opinion in Paradise.
201. Id. at 167-70.
202. Id. at 171.
203. Id. at 171-83.
204. Id. at 185.
205. Id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell had endorsed the availability of waiver
as an element of an affirmative action plan deemed necessary to promote the compelling gov-
ernmental interest in ameliorating the effects of past discrimination when he voted to uphold a
10 percent "set-aside" for minority business enterprises under a federal contract grant pro-
gram. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
206. 480 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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gent than required by strict scrutiny. '07 She directed her primary
criticism at the analysis of the first of the four factors Brennan used
to evaluate whether the remedy was narrowly tailored. She argued
that several alternatives to racial preferences, like fines and contempt
citations, could have compelled compliance with the federal court de-
cree to end discrimination in promotions.20 8 Showing sympathy for
the white troopers, she preferred an alternative having a "lesser ef-
fect" on their rights.20 9
The coalition supporting O'Connor's view of racial equal pro-
tection remedies did not find a majority in Paradise, but the case
signified the attention that the Court would pay to the validity of the
evidence supporting claims of past or present violations of the equal
protection clause. Although it is not an affirmative action case, the
discussion of evidentiary requirements in the death penalty case of
McCleskey v. Kemp 210 sheds light on the treatment of evidentiary
issues by the Rehnquist Court. In this case an African-American de-
fendant (McCleskey) claimed racial discrimination existed in the
Georgia capital sentencing process. Much of Powell's opinion, joined
by Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Scalia, addressed the issue of
evidence. Powell concluded that statistical evidence of discrimination
in the administration of the penalty did not sufficiently prove a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause. He argued that the clause de-
manded exceptionally clear proof, proof "that the decision-makers in
his case acted with discriminatory purpose. '21 According to Powell,
McCleskey had offered "no evidence specific to his own case that
would support an inference that racial considerations played a part
in his sentence. '212 A statistical study of capital sentencing patterns,
he judged, failed to establish whether the circumstances of this par-
ticular death sentence were biased by racial considerations. Powell,
in dicta, also speculated that the evidentiary approach proffered by
McCleskey could lead to use of statistical studies of sentencing bias
to upset existing decisions about every category of criminal convic-
tion.2" He seemed to be unwilling to tolerate such a potential dis-
ruption. Therefore, he suggested that, absent direct evidence of racial
bias in a case, legislatures ought to remedy any sentencing bias dis-
207. Id. at 197 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 199-201 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 201 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
.210. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
211. Id. at 292 (emphasis in original).
212. Id. at 292-93.
213. Id. at 314-15.
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closed by statistical studies.21 4
McCleskey produced three dissenting opinions: Brennan, joined
by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens; Blackmun, joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens; and Stevens, joined by Blackmun. Brennan
addressed the evidentiary issue, and Blackmun went on to propose
another approach to equality issues. Brennan's dissent argued that
McCleskey was a member of a group about whom the statistical evi-
dence "relentlessly documents the risk that [his] sentence was influ-
enced by racial considerations. 21  Also, he stressed that the state
prosecuting McCleskey, Georgia, had a long history of race-con-
scious criminal justice. These factors, Brennan judged, raised a rea-
sonable concern that discriminatory racial bias affected the sen-
tence. 16 He then criticized the majority opinion for relying on
statutory safeguards that might be biased and for raising unfounded
fears about the ramifications for future cases of a decision favoring
McCleskey.2" 7 Blackmun continued the attack on the majority by
suggesting that McCleskey had established a prime facie case of dis-
crimination. According to Blackmun, McCleskey had shown that he
was a member of a disadvantaged group, had suffered a substantial
degree of different -treatment as evidenced by statistical data and
Georgia procedures, and had suffered the different treatment because
of a racially discriminatory procedure. 2 8 By using this test he also
suggested that, despite the fears of the majority, it would benefit soci-
ety to have a closer examination of racial considerations throughout
the criminal justice process.
Building on themes identified in Paradise and McCleskey, the
majority justices in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.21 9 zeroed in
on both the standard of review and the evidence of discrimination
issues. For the Court, O'Connor focused her evaluation of a Rich-
mond ordinance requiring the city's prime contractors to adhere to a
30 percent minority "set aside" for subcontractors on whether the
program satisfied a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to
accomplish a remedial purpose.
O'Connor began her opinion by contending that Justice Mar-
shall had tried to relax strict scrutiny in instances of racial discrimi-
nation to further allegedly remedial policy goals. She thought such
214. Id. at 319.
215. Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 328-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 335-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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an approach let the level of scrutiny vary "according to the ability of
different groups to defend their interests." 2 She thus found the
Marshall approach to be unsound because it was race-conscious and
did not universally apply to all categories of racial groups. Instead,
O'Connor defined a compelling interest in remedying past discrimi-
nation as existing only when there was an individualized application
of remedies by government to specific harmful acts of discrimination
as confirmed by specific evidence on the record.221 She found no such
evidence on the record in this case.
O'Connor's review of the evidence of discrimination offered to
justify the plan concluded that the lack of detailed connections be-
tween discrimination in the community and contract award practices
resulted in a failure to establish a prima facie case of a specific con-
stitutional or a statutory violation. She refused to accept the idea that
a history of general patterns of societal discrimination directly disad-
vantaged minority contractors.222 Although she could have ended her
discussion at this point, she went on to cite the city for a failure to
design narrowly tailored remedies. She contended that the city had
not considered race-neutral alternatives to the plan and had used a
quota rather than narrower, case-by-case review of discrimination
claims."' Thus, the Richmond set-aside plan was race-conscious and
contrary to her understanding of the individualized remedy required
for an affirmative action plan to meet the strict scrutiny standard.
Kennedy largely supported O'Connor's position in a concurring
opinion, but he stressed that he would only support remedial legisla-
tive action if there was a finding of "intentional discrimination."22
Scalia also concurred in a unique and disjointed opinion arguing that
the fourteenth amendment and the federal structure of constitutional
government authorized only the federal government to use racial
classifications to remedy discrimination.28 To prevent oppressive
acts by one racial group against another, states had only the power
to eliminate their own systems of unlawful racial classification and to
devise remedial programs that were not race-specific. Hence, states
and their subdivisions could not adopt any race-conscious remedial
220. Id. at 495.
221. Id. at 496-98.
222. Id. at 498-506.
223. Id. at 507-08.
224. Id. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
225. Scalia did not focus on standards of review, but did indicate his general agreement
with the proposition that strict scrutiny should be applied to all racial classifications by govern-
ment. d. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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programs. Scalia then returned to the compelling interest issue to
aver support for the individualized evidence criteria for the use of
race-conscious remedies advanced by O'Connor for the Court.22 Ste-
vens concurred because the remedy was too sweeping given the harm
that he was able to identify.""7
Marshall was left to defend the proposition that race-conscious
classifications designed to further remedial goals did not have to sat-
isfy the highest level of scrutiny. Using a test of intensified but not
strict scrutiny first appearing in the joint Brennan, Marshall, White,
and Blackmun opinion in the Bakke case,22 Marshall indicted that
remedial programs had only "to serve important governmental objec-
tives" and "be substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives. 22 9 For Marshall the important governmental objectives justi-
fying the program were the necessity of eliminating the harm
generated by discrimination in the construction industry and the
need to prevent the harm of perpetuating the effects of such discrimi-
nation. 30 Marshall then documented the continuing harms of past
discrimination and took the majority to task for dismissing the value
of various statements and other evidence offered by the city.2"' Hav-
ing established discriminatory intent, he showed how the racially-
conscious set-aside remedy devised by the city, including the 30 per-
cent "quota," was substantially related to the interest in remedying
past discrimination. He found that the program provided a workable
remedy that was not "sweeping" and that did almost no harm to
white-owned firms. 2 2
Marshall concluded his Croson dissent by indicating that he
was troubled by the majority's inability to distinguish between racist
actions and actions designed to prevent the perpetuation of racism.
In large measure he sought to justify the use of an intermediate stan-
dard of scrutiny in race conscious remedy cases where government
sought to alleviate or prevent the perpetuation of racism, and a strict
standard only when governmental actions themselves sponsored ra-
cism. The aim of his discussion was to avoid a "conventional" appli-
cation of strict scrutiny that was "fatal" to efforts to eliminate the
226. Id. at 526-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
227. Id. at 511-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
228. Univ. of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Opinion of Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
229. Croson, 488 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 536-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 539-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 548-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ongoing effects of discrimination.2"' Additionally, he excoriated
Scalia for the failure to recognize a distinction between the two sets
of cases and for his "artful" effort to cordon off federal and state
remedial efforts through a mistaken interpretation of the aims of
school desegregation case doctrine and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."3 4 Blackmun appended three paragraphs of pithy dissent that
lamented the Court's regression from a role as a "bastion of
equality."2 '
In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,2 3 " Brennan offered his final
Supreme Court opinion. At issue was a Federal Communications
Commission order establishing preferences for minorities in the
awarding of new broadcast licenses and a plan allowing transfer of
existing licenses to a minority enterprise without a hearing before
the FCC. Brennan used "intermediate tier" scrutiny in his analysis.
He held that this measure mandated by Congress had only to "serve
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress"
that were "substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."2 ' He justified his use of intermediate scrutiny on the basis of
Fullilove v. Klutznick,36 in which the Court upheld a federal stat-
ute mandating a 10 percent minority set-aside in a federal construc-
tion grant program. Neither the plurality opinion by Burger, nor
Marshall's concurring opinion in that case had utilized strict scru-
tiny to evaluate an affirmative action program mandated by
Congress.
In applying the intermediate test, Brennan found that the FCC
rule did serve an important governmental objective, specifically the
creation of diversity of expression in a situation where circumstances
restricted the opportunities for the exchange of opinion."3 9 He also
concluded that the FCC policy was based on substantial evidence
which indicated a connection between minority ownership and diver-
sity. Further, the judgment of the linkage did not rest on impermissi-
ble racial stereotyping. Congress and the FCC, he judged, had sim-
ply tried to enhance the chances of broadcast diversity in the
aggregate.2" The FCC had considered other alternatives, and the
233. Id. at 551-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 558-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
237. Id. at 3009.
238. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
239. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010-11.
240. Id. at 3016.
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minority licensing rules it established were limited in extent, subject
to flexible adjustment by Congress, and imposed no impermissible
burdens on nonminorities since at issue was a very small percentage
of all broadcast licenses." 1 Stevens concurred in a brief note that
endorsed Brennan's opinion because the FCC program, unlike the
set-aside plan struck down in Croson, offered future benefits rather
than a remedy for past discrimination.2" 2
O'Connor dissented, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy.
Her opinion began with the argument that Croson mandated strict
scrutiny of a racial classification such as the FCC policy. She re-
jected the analysis based on Fullilove, contending that congressional
remedies for discrimination should not be reviewed under an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny.2"" Strangely for a conservative, this put her
in the position of arguing against judicial restraint in reviewing acts
of Congress. She felt that all racial classifications, including those
that were purportedly "benign," had to be subjected to the same
level of scrutiny, thereby rejecting the implications of Brennan's
opinion and the Marshall dissent in Croson. She found that she sim-
ply could not distinguish benevolent from unconstitutional race-con-
scious acts and apply differing levels of scrutiny to different kinds of
governmental action, for, "[a] lower standard signals that the Gov-
ernment may resort to racial distinctions more readily.) 24 4
O'Connor then criticized Brennan's analysis of the tailoring of
the FCC policy. Again her argument contended that the policy was
too amorphous and unspecific to alleviate past discrimination in a
verifiable manner. The policy employed the "vague" association of
societal discrimination with specific harms that had been rejected in
Croson and other cases. Also, the policy presumed values were asso-
ciated with race and used race as a matter of administrative conve-
nience. Furthermore, the policy was adopted without assessment of
more racially neutral methods for creating program diversity, was
not clearly endorsed -by Congress, and was unduly burdensome to
individuals who were not members of the favored minority by creat-
ing a quota scheme in license transfers.24 5
Kennedy, joined by Scalia, also wrote a dissenting opinion.
Kennedy's opinion criticized the abandonment of strict scrutiny by
Brennan for what he considered to be the "trivial" reason of broad-
241. Id. at 3022-27.
242. Id. at 3028 (Stevens, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 3030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 3033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 3033-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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cast diversity.1' He felt that strict scrutiny had to be applied in all
cases where racial classifications were at issue. Also, he contended
that any treatment of groups and disadvantaged classes, as the sub-
ject of remedies, was unsatisfactory because "our Constitution pro-
tects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group.
' 247
Interestingly, Metro Broadcasting marked the unannounced return
of White to the intermediate level of analysis he had accepted in
Bakke but had rejected in Croson.
Although voting and opinion coalitions on equal protection is-
sues shifted from case to case in the Rehnquist Court, clearly Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun stood on the side of intermediate scru-
tiny, except in Paradise, and of using indirect evidence when
remedies for past and potential racial discrimination were at issue.
They saw a danger that a "neutral" strict scrutiny standard in most
of these cases would actually abet the continuation of discrimina-
tion. 4 On the contrary, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
saw the virtue of neutral law and limited relief for discrimination.
Underlying their insistence on application of strict scrutiny in all
affirmative action cases is a view that all racial discrimination is of
one kind.
Although the use of strict scrutiny in equal protection issues has
undergone modification, the preponderance of equality issues before
the Rehnquist Court have been resolved through statutory interpre-
tation. Particularly the justices have addressed the definition of
equality advanced by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
federal statutes adopted to enforce the equal protection clause. Over-
all, the action of the majority of the justices on this issue has rein-
forced the trend of equal protection clause interpretations that have
made it more difficult for minority claimants to introduce evidence to
substantiate discrimination against them. 4
246. Id. at 3045 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 3046 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
248. See BAER, supra note 2, at 117.
249. Among the many cases that illustrate the parallels between the treatment of eviden-
tiary issues by the Rehnquist Court in statutory cases and similar issues in constitutional cases
are Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) and Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
In Wards Cove, a 5-4 decision with a majority opinion by White, the Court demanded
that the alleged victims of racial discrimination in employment produce more than statistical
proof to justify their claim and demands for race-conscious remedies. The burden was placed
on the alleged victims to show that each challenged practice had a disparate impact on their
employment opportunities. Only after the establishment of a prima facie case in this fashion
would the burden of proof shift to the employer. 490 U.S. at 658; see also Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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Thus, in both the constitutional and statutory racial equality
cases the Rehnquist Court was closely divided and often so split that
only plurality opinions emerged. However, the only consistent de-
In a Title VII gender discrimination case, a divided Court offered four opinions on the
standard to be used to evaluate evidence of discrimination and on the assignment of the burden
of proof. However, the outcome indicated that parties alleging any form of illegal discrimina-
tion have to prove their case only through the satisfaction of a preponderance of the evidence
standard, an establishment of evidence that the employer would not have made the same deci-
sion except for the illegitimate discriminatory impulse. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989).
Besides making the burden of evidentiary proof more difficult for parties alleging discrim-
ination, the Court read statutes in ways that affected participation and the ability to present
evidence in discrimination cases. In a challenge to a seniority system, Scalia ruled that only
evidence of discrimination at the time of adoption of a seniority system could be considered in a
Title VII suit. Evidence of discriminatory effects of the seniority system more than 300 days
after its initiation could not be considered to prevent disruption of a seniority scheme relied on
by other employees. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). Rehnquist, in
a 5-4 decision, used the Rules of Civil Procedure to permit white fire fighters to challenge a
consent decree to settle a Title VII dispute between a city and black fire fighters. The decision
raised the possibility of continuing challenges to voluntary or court-ordered affirmative action
by third parties alleging harm from the efforts of minorities to win relief under civil rights
laws. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). Finally, an opinion for the Court by Scalia made
it difficult for unions and other interest group intervenors, supporting a claimant alleging dis-
crimination under Title VII, to collect attorney fees. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
Only in Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), did a 5-4 majority approve an
affirmative action employment program under Title VII. O'Connor provided the deciding vote
and concurring opinion. She found that the prima facie evidence of prior discrimination, be-
cause of the absence of women in a work force, afforded the governmental employer the oppor-
tunity to establish a voluntary affirmative action plan. The plan was legal under Title VII so
long as the employer had a "firm need" that remedial action was necessary. This was a stricter
standard than that employed by Brennan for the Court.
The justices' treatment of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 has made equality claims more difficult by
restricting the situations about which a party claiming discrimination can present evidence. For
a 5-4 majority Kennedy read § 1981 to preclude suits against alleged acts of sexual harassment
committed after employment. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The
Court also adopted a reading of § 1981 which made it more difficult to initiate challenges
against allegedly discriminatory governmental conduct by making a respondeat superior argu-
ment unavailable. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
Finally, the Court made it more difficult to remedy discriminatory acts after liability was
established. Rehnquist relied on the Rules of Civil Procedure to forbid a District Court from
sanctioning city council members in Yonkers, New York who failed to vote for an ordinance
necessary to achieve the implementation of a public housing desegregation remedy under Title
VII. For a 5-4 majority he wrote that the sanctions were a "perversion of the normal legisla-
tive process" and that less extreme measures should have been used. Spallone v. United States,
493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990); but compare Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The only
bright spot for proponents of civil rights has been the justices' willingness to expand the defini-
tion of disadvantaged groups which can claim discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982,
to include Arab and Jewish Americans. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604
(1987); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). However, this change also
might mark a symbolic diminishment of the use of legal guarantees as an instrument for the
achievement of equality by African Americans.
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fense of disadvantaged groups came from Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun. O'Connor and Stevens carved out their own unique ap-
proaches in these cases, but they often ended up in a voting coalition
with Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy that used the language of strict
scrutiny to deny equality claims. This coalition shaped the concept of
strict scrutiny and the compelling interest standard in such a fashion
that governments could never have a compelling reason to assist a
disadvantaged group. White enigmatically never wrote an opinion on
equal protection and split his votes among the coalitions.
VI. STRICT SCRUTINY IN OTHER CONTEXTS
The underlying logic of strict scrutiny discourse in the Warren
and Burger Courts did not limit the possible range of heightened
scrutiny to cases involving First Amendment claims and racial classi-
fications. By the time of Shapiro v. Thompson,25 the justices gener-
ally recognized that strict scrutiny was appropriate if a discrimina-
tory classification was based on inherently suspect criteria or
interfered with the exercise of a fundamental right. While Burger
Court majorities were more likely to deem nonracial classifications
"semi-suspect" than "suspect," 25 the fact remains that a form of
heightened scrutiny was generally applied in equal protection cases
involving classifications by sex or birth status (legitimacy or illegiti-
macy). 52 Outside the equal protection area, the Burger Court from
time to time endorsed the use of heightened scrutiny in substantive
due process cases involving a fundamental right."5 Thus, Section VI
of this article concludes the discussion of strict scrutiny in the first
four terms of the Rehnquist Court with a brief overview of nonracial
equal protection cases and substantive due process cases.
A. Nonracial Equal Protection Cases
Cases presenting equal protection challenges to nonracial classi-
fications by federal and state governments were fairly rare during
the first four years of the Rehnquist Court and were handled with
relatively little coalitional conflict. A unanimous opinion by Justice
250. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down durational residence
requirements for welfare benefits that burdened the right of interstate travel).
251. Galloway, Basic Equal Protection, supra note 19, at 142-47.
252. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny in sex
discrimination case); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (applying standard that is
less stringent than strict scrutiny, but not "toothless" to classifications based on "illegitimacy").
253. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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O'Connor in Clark v. Jeter254 suggested a broad consensus on the
propriety of the heightened scrutiny framework and on rules gov-
erning its application. The justices unanimously applied the interme-
diate standard requiring a substantial relationship to an important
governmental objective to strike down a state law setting a six-year
statute of limitations applicable to paternity suits. Moreover, all ninejustices joined O'Connor's opinion, which included a paragraph
spelling out the appropriate levels of scrutiny for different kinds of
classifications.25
The justices also tended toward unanimity in applying the ra-
tional basis standard to reject equal protection claims involving eco-
nomic issues.2" In City of Dallas v. Stanglin15 7 the Court, rejecting
First Amendment claims, applied the rational basis test to uphold an
ordinance imposing age restrictions in "teenage dance halls." Yet,
not all equal protection claims of businesses were rejected. In Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commissioners of Webster
County2" the Court unanimously struck down, under a nondeferen-
tial rationality standard, 5" a property tax assessment scheme that
resulted in gross disparities in taxation of comparable properties.20
Also struck down without dissent was a land ownership requirement
for appointment to a government board.2" 1 Finally, the Court was
unanimous in ruling that underrepresentation of larger boroughs on
New York City's Board of Estimate violated the equal protection
clause. 6 2 Although Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun filed brief con-
254. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
255. Id. at 1914.
256. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); United States v. Sperry Corp., 493
U.S. 52 (1990).
257. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
258. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
259. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny, supra note 19, at 452-53.
260. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. at 343-44. This case is of great interest to Califor-
nia taxpayers because it has provided the foundation for an equal protection challenge to the
system of property taxation created by voter approval of Proposition 13 in 1978. R.H. Macy
& Co. v. Contra Costa County, 226 Cal. App. 3d 352, 276 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1991) cert. granted
111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991), cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 2923 (1991). The U.S. Supreme Court's
decision to hear the Macy's case produced sufficient controversy and economic pressure to
induce Macy's to withdraw its petition. Oswald Johnston & Kevin Roderick, Macy's Aban-
dons Plea to Overturn Prop. 13's Legality, L.A. TIMEs, June 8, 1991, at Al. However, the
issue of the constitutionality of the California system of property taxation remains on the
Court's docket in a case brought by a Los Angeles County homeowner who paid a property
tax five times higher than neighbors with similar homes. In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct.
2326 (1992), the Court distinguished Allegheney Pittsburgh and upheld Proposition 13 using a
deferential rational basis standard.
261. Quinn v. Milsapp, 491 U.S. 95 (1989).
262. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
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curring opinions, they raised no objections to Justice White's major-
ity opinion applying established reapportionment doctrine in lan-
guage suggesting a heightened scrutiny standard.
Coalitional conflict characterized only a handful of nonracial
equal protection cases, most notably Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools.2' With Justice O'Connor writing for a majority comprised
of the four Reagan appointees and Justice White, the Court upheld
a North Dakota law allowing "nonreorganized" school districts to
charge a fee for school bus service. O'Connor offered a basic review
of the application of "strict" and "heightened" scrutiny standards in
prior equal protection cases, concluding that the rational basis stan-
dard was the appropriate test in this case. 2" Of the four dissenters,
two disagreed with O'Connor's determination of the proper standard
and two with her application of the rationality standard. Joined by
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall reiterated his long-standing posi-
tion that "proper analysis of equal protection claims depends less on
choosing the 'formal label' under which the claim should be reviewed
than upon identifying and carefully analyzing the real interests at
stake." 265 Although he conceded that "[tlhis Court has determined
that classifications based on wealth are not automatically suspect," 2 "
he relied primarily on late Warren Court opinions267 and Plyler v.
Doe268 to justify the conclusion that "exacting scrutiny should be ap-
plied" when a state law "has the predictable tendency to entrap the
poor and create a permanent underclass. ''2 69 Just as the Texas law
excluding children of illegal aliens from free public education bur-
dened the "educational opportunities of a disadvantaged group of
children '2 70 and could not be justified, so the application of the bus
transportation fee to indigent families in this case did not rest on a
substantial state interest.2 71 Justice Stevens, joined by Blackmun,
concluded that the challenged law could not survive rational basis
scrutiny.27 2 In Lyng v. International Union2 78 all of the justices
263. 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
264. Id. at 458-62.
265. Id. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 468 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
267. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs. of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
268. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down Texas law allowing school districts to bar
children of illegal aliens from public schools).
269. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 470-71 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
271. Id. at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 472-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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agreed on application of the rational basis standard to judge the con-
stitutionality of a federal law restricting strikers' eligibility for food
stamps, but Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun disputed the major-
ity's conclusion that the law was rationally related to a legitimate
purpose. 74
Otherwise, coalitional conflict in nonrace equal protection cases
was quite muted. In Pennsylvania v. Finley217 Brennan and Mar-
shall took issue with the majority's rejection of all constitutional
claims by a convict whose appointed counsel withdrew from the case
on the basis that there were no collateral claims worth pursuing.
Justice Brennan declared in a dissenting opinion that "[e]qual pro-
tection demands that the State eliminate unfair disparities between
classes of individuals. ' 27  In Bankers Life & Casualty v. Cren-
shaw2 77 only Blackmun dissented from a section of Marshall's opin-
ion rejecting, under rational basis standards, an insurance company's
claim that a state law penalizing unsuccessful appeals in civil cases
violated the equal protection clause. Although he accepted the major-
ity's articulation of the proper standard, Blackmun concluded that
the penalty statute was not rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose.2 78 In a 5-4 majority rejecting both statutory and equal pro-
tection claims in a welfare benefits case, Blackmun, Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens dissented on statutory grounds without reaching
the constitutional question. 9
B. Substantive Due Process Cases
In contrast to the relatively high level of consensus in nonracial
equal protection cases is a striking degree of coalitional conflict in
the substantive due process cases of the Rehnquist Court. Yet, the
internal debate in these cases seems to turn more on defining the
substantive rights protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
than on the appropriate level of scrutiny when substantive due pro-
cess rights are recognized. In general, Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun were in agreement that rights should be recognized
and accorded judicial protection, while Rehnquist, Scalia, and Ken-
273. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
274. Id. at 374 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
275. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
276. Id. at 569 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
277. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
278. Id. at 90-91 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at
496-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nedy sought to narrow due process rights. Decisions turned on the
ability of either group to attract the support of swing voters
O'Connor, Stevens, Powell, and White. Because two or more of
these justices tended to lean toward the position of the Chief Justice
and his allies, the narrow view of substantive due process rights was
normally the majority position. In a pair of early substantive due
process cases, the conservative coalition prevailed in rejecting a con-
stitutional claim of entitlement to pretrial release on bail,2 80 while
the liberals gained a majority for a ruling that an "expectancy of
release on parole" could be a substantive liberty interest protected by
the due process clause. 8' In later cases, the conservative coalition
generally prevailed in debates over the scope of due process rights. 82
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.283 the conservative majority and the
dissenters debated the methodology of declaring substantive rights
and the scope of those rights rather than levels of scrutiny. Similarly
in Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Department of Health284 the de-
bate between Rehnquist and Scalia on one hand and Brennan on the
other focused primarily on the nature of the right to make decisions
about health care, though Brennan explicitly argued that the right to
refuse unwanted treatment is a fundamental right demanding the
protection of heightened scrutiny.28 5
Even in the abortion cases of the first four years of the Rehn-
quist Court, debate centered more on the scope or generality of the
asserted privacy right and on the future of Roe v. Wade281 than on
standards of review. Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services28 7 alluded to the debate
over standards of review at several points, most notably in arguing
that a state interest in protecting fetal life was no less compelling
before viability than after.288 Ultimately the decision to uphold the
viability testing provision of the Missouri statute turned on Rehn-
280. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
281. Board. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
282. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITU-
TION 73-80 (1991). A good example of a narrow reading of the scope of due process rights is
DeShaney v. Winnebego County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In that case the
majority ruled over the protest of Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun that the due process
clause creates no affirmative obligation to provide protection against private violence.
283. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (rejecting substantive due process claim of "right" to establish
paternity).
284. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
285. Id. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
286. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
287. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
288. Id. at 519.
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quist's conclusion that the provision "is reasonably designed" to pro-
mote the state's "legitimate end" of assuring that "abortions are not
performed when the fetus is viable."2 " Although the dissenters took
issue with Rehnquist on the standard of review question," ' the cen-
tral theme of Justice Blackmun's dissent was the future threat to the
right of privacy recognized and protected by the Roe v. Wade
framework. 291
The two 1990 abortion cases, both dealing with parental notifi-
cation laws for minors, also featured a high level of coalitional con-
flict, with five justices writing opinions in Hodgson v. Minnesota.292
The prevailing opinion by Stevens was joined by O'Connor and the
liberal trio in striking down Minnesota's virtually absolute require-
ment of notice to both parents prior to a minor's abortion, while the
four Reagan appointees plus White formed a majority to uphold an
alternative statutory provision permitting a judicial bypass procedure
as a means of avoiding notification of both parents. Stevens (joined
only by Brennan on this point), maintained that the burden of estab-
lishing constitutionality rested with the state, 2" but applied rational-
ity standards to reach the conclusion that a two-parent notification
requirement "does not reasonably further any legitimate state inter-
est."294 Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun agreed that the "two par-
ent notification requirement is not even reasonably related to a legit-
imate state interest," but they explicitly reiterated the position that
Roe v. Wade was still controlling and that laws limiting the funda-
mental right to choose abortion should be subjected to the "most ex-
acting scrutiny" of the compelling interest standard.295
In an opinion joined by White, Rehnquist, and Scalia, Justice
Kennedy explicitly invoked precedent and the principle of deference
to the legislature, stressed the legitimacy of state interests in protect-
ing minors and promoting the role of parents in the care of children,
and ultimately seemed to rely on rationality standards in arguing
that the two-parent notification provision should be upheld with or
289. Id. at 520.
290. According to Justice Blackmun, "the plurality's novel test appears to be nothing
more than a dressed-up version of rational-basis review, this Court's most lenient level of
scrutiny." Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). In addition, Blackmun maintained that "the viability testing provision does not pass con-
stitutional muster even under a rational basis standard . Id. at 543.
291. Id. at 538, 557-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
292. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
293. Id. at 2937.
294. Id. at 2945.
295. Id. at 2952 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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without a judicial bypass." Justice O'Connor based her critical vote
on her previously stated view that a law that does not impose an
"undue burden" on a woman's right to choose should be reviewed
under a rational basis standard.29 Applying this rule, she concluded
that the two-parent notice requirement without a judicial bypass
procedure was "unreasonable," but found the alternative procedure
constitutionally permissible. " 8 In a companion case, six justices
found that Ohio's requirement of one-parent notification with a judi-
cial bypass option met constitutional standards, although only four
justices endorsed the section of Justice Kennedy's prevailing opinion
concluding that the state legislature had "acted in a rational man-
ner" to assure that in most cases a young woman facing a decision
on abortion "will receive guidance and understanding from a
parent." 99
Aside from the abortion cases, coalitional conflict only occasion-
ally centered on the standard of review applicable in substantive due
process cases. In Bowen v. Gilliard.°° Justice Stevens had the sup-
port of a six-member majority for reaffirming the Burger Court rule
that only a rational basis was required to sustain welfare legisla-
tion.30' Without endorsing any particular heightened scrutiny
formula, Justice Brennan argued that welfare laws that imposed a
substantial burden on the individual's "fundamental interest in fam-
ily life"'3 0 2 "must be justified by more than a mere assertion that the
provision is rational."308 In Washington v. Harper'4 the conserva-
tive majority and three liberal dissenters agreed that a prisoner's
substantive liberty interests included freedom from arbitrary admin-
istration of antipsychotic drugs and on use of a standard of review
derived from earlier prisoner rights cases,"0 ' but not on application
of that standard. In short, coalitional conflict on standards of review
296. Id. at 2961 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
297. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
298. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2950-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
299. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
300. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
301. Stevens correctly attributed the Burger Court's rule of applying the rational basis
standard in welfare rights cases to Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970), but
clearly erred in his assertion that Justice Stewart wrote for a unanimous court in that case.
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 609.
302. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 619 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 628 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
304. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).




was a significant feature of the Rehnquist Court's substantive due
process litigation, but the debate on standards was mixed with and
often overshadowed by a more fundamental debate about the scope
of the underlying rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The consideration in this article of strict scrutiny in cases de-
cided on First Amendment, equal protection, and substantive due
process grounds reveals general acceptance of means-end scrutiny as
a model for resolving conflicts between individual rights and govern-
mental power during the first four years of the Rehnquist Court.
More specifically, a surprisingly strong consensus emerged during
this period that some form of heightened scrutiny was appropriate in
a wide range of constitutional cases. All of the justices agreed in
principle that the most stringent form of strict scrutiny was the
proper standard for reviewing restrictions on core political speech,
and the early Rehnquist Court was by no means hostile to protection
of First Amendment rights. There were, however, debates about the
appropriate standard of review in many freedom of expression cases,
and all of the justices except Brennan and Marshall supported a def-
erential approach in a significant number of such cases. Strict scru-
tiny was not applied in commercial speech cases, and Scalia's opin-
ion in Employment Division v. Smith80+ indicates an effort to roll
back the application of strict scrutiny in cases raising free exercise
claims. Agreement that some form of heightened scrutiny is appro-
priate in a wide range of equal protection cases, particularly those
involving racial classifications, cannot overshadow sharp disagree-
ment within the Court about the standard to be applied in affirma-
tive action cases or even more frequent disputes about criteria for the
assessment of evidence relevant to constitutional issues.
In short, debates about standards of review reveal a limited con-
sensus on basic principles, accompanied by sharp conflict over the
application of these principles. These conflicts were reflected in a
fluid pattern of coalitions that shifted from issue to issue and from
case to case within a single issue area.307 The Rehnquist Court's use
of many variations of means-end scrutiny and related debates about
306. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
307. Among the causes of these shifting patterns are Scalia's support for the application
of strict scrutiny in many political speech cases, O'Connor's commitment to the "endorsement"
approach in establishment clause cases, White's sometimes unexplained and apparently incon-
sistent positions in establishment and racial equal protection cases, and the unique approach to
rights issues voiced in many of Stevens' opinions.
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evidentiary standards to be used in resolving conflicts about rights
and equality issues indicates that this is a Court lacking a common
or even bipolar pattern of constitutional discourse. Small coalitions of
justices must often find common ground with other small coalitions
to produce a decision. When a decision emerges, it often reflects only
the views of a plurality of the justices and is hemmed in by the lan-
guage of concurring opinions. No clear "Rehnquist Court" majority
position emerged during Rehnquist's first four years as Chief Jus-
tice. 808 Perhaps the fracturing of the Court reflects both Justice
Brennan's continuing influence on his colleagues and the fact that
Rehnquist and his conservative allies could not always agree on why
some constitutional claims should be rejected.
Moreover, it is important to note that acceptance of the analyti-
cal framework and language of heightened scrutiny by all members
of the Court, including the Reagan appointees, does not mean that
the Court will systematically use its power of judicial review to de-
fend interests of disadvantaged groups in American society.
Whatever the pattern of coalitional conflict in a particular issue area,
it is striking that during the Rehnquist Court era the outcome of
internal debates has generally made it difficult to assert successfully
innovative claims of rights. As commentators such as Timothy
O'Neill, Martha Minow, and Robin West have noted, much of the
language of equality and rights standards functions to confine these
concepts and exclude more radical definitions of rights.8"9 The re-
sulting outcomes stifle demands of the disadvantaged for protection
under the Constitution. As a result of the rejection of the Brennan-
Marshall approach in many cases, the Court has offered only trun-
cated protection for the interests of disadvantaged groups.
More critical for the future of rights might be the language of
Rehnquist Court coalitions that legitimizes "reasonable" restrictions
on the rights of disadvantaged groups. The vision of the political
order advanced by coalitions joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy is dominated by a reluctance to recognize the injury to the body
politic engendered by an individualistic construction of rights and
308. Thus, this article provides support for earlier findings that Rehnquist has not been
particularly successful as a leader who shaped Court decisions that generally conformed with
the Chief Justice's own policy goals. See Davis, supra note 3.
309. See Timothy J. O'Neill, The Language of Equality in a Constitutional Order, 75
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 626 (1981); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE
(1990); Robin West, Toward a Modern Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-




equal protection. These justices are disinclined to accept evidence of
social injury and afford constitutional protection to a person as a
member of a group or faction as opposed to privatized individual
injury. They attend to only part of the disadvantages confronted by
some Americans, and, hence, they learn about only part of the social
behavior that creates potential liability for harms to rights and equal
protection of the laws. Consequently, this coalition can at best assign
a restricted or partial blame when they find incidents of political and
social disempowerment and inequality directed against disadvantaged
political, religious, and racial groups. When these justices engage in
rights discourse they also use legal language to associate their posi-
tion with "neutrality" (as in Croson), the traditions of the public (as
in the establishment clause cases), or the virtues of political order (as
in free expression and free exercise cases). At the same time these
coalitions use language that conceals behind the concept of legal neu-
trality the harm done to the interests of disadvantaged groups
through the outcome of the decision. The concept of rights and
equality advanced by these justices thus becomes a set of values that
maintains the political power of the interests that they support. The
opinion language thus helps to defend those interests against coun-
terclaims by defenders of the disadvantaged.
Also, because these justices tend to prefer majority values and
because they believe that a law constructed by a majority is neutral,
they are not sensitive to the idea that a concept of equality can recog-
nize differences in a search for rights and polity principles beneficial
to the polity. Their idea of remedies, especially in equal protection
cases, applies the majority's notion of the means of insuring equality
without ever admitting its partiality. No effort is made to envision
equality from the vantage point of the disadvantaged group. They
remain reluctant to debate about the political choice of designing
remedies for the unfair differences that mar the polity and of tolerat-
ing other differences. Rather, they would escape political conflict and
reproduce the existing political order by assuming that racial differ-
ences can be dealt with by allegedly neutral standards. They ignore
the differences exposed by other disadvantaged political and religious
groups by reference to the values of law, order, and tradition sup-
ported by legislative majorities. Thus, the Court is to have no active
role in engendering the protection of the disadvantaged proffered by
the equal protection clause and other constitutional guarantees.
Finally, what of the future of rights claims before the Supreme
Court now that Justice Brennan has retired after 34 years as cham-
pion of the claims of the disadvantaged? The coalitional patterns
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identified in this article seem to suggest considerable potential for
new departures. Many decisions upholding rights claims were de-
cided by narrow 5-4 or 6-3 majorities during the first four years of
the Rehnquist Court. When constitutional claims were rejected, the
justices in the majority often have been unable to unite behind an
Opinion of the Court.
Thus, the departure of Brennan and the appointment of David
H. Souter probably marks as important a change in the U.S. Su-
preme Court as any event in the past half century. During his testi-
mony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Souter relied on levels
of scrutiny language in addressing questions put to him by senators,
but the sheer plentitude of definitions and applications of this lan-
guage on the contemporary Court raises questions about future ap-
plications of this approach to resolving constitutional questions. In-
deed, the replacement of Brennan by Souter suggests parallels to
other situations when strong proponents of a particular mode of con-
stitutional discourse either joined or left the Court. In 1938-41 the
dual federalists were 'eplaced by nationalists. In 1953 the appoint-
ment of Warren meant the Court acquired a strong leader with lib-
eral sensitivities, and in 1962 the primary theoretician of judicial re-
straint left the Court, opening the way to the "heyday" of Warren
Court activism. 310 The replacement of Brennan, the primary archi-
tect of contemporary standards of discourse about rights and equal
protection, with a judge whose appointment hearings gave little evi-
dence of commitment to the Brennan agenda could be extremely sig-
nificant. Thus, there is reason to think that the Souter appointment
will make more likely the solidification of Court coalitions dominated
by the appointees of recent Republican presidents. 1 '
For example, a stronger coalition supporting strict scrutiny in at
least some equal protection cases seems likely. Yet, the use of the
compelling interest standard in affirmative action cases like Croson
has the potential to gut the Brennan legacy and threaten the intellec-
tual basis for the special protection of disadvantaged groups that has
guided the Court since Carolene Products. If the justices remaining
on the Court are unable to formulate the kinds of arguments found
in many of Brennan's opinions, strict scrutiny might be applied pri-
310. Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court Liberalism,
20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841 (1980).
311. A coalition of Souter and the four Reagan appointees made up the majority when
the justices voted to uphold against a First Amendment challenge a ban on nude dancing under
a public indecency law in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). Souter did not join
Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, however, concurring on narrower grounds.
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marily when litigants representing relatively advantaged interests
challenge affirmative action plans or governmental restrictions on the
use of money in political campaigns.312
Outside the areas such as racial equal protection and political
speech, where the coalition supporting strict scrutiny is strongest, in-
creased resort to deferential standards is a distinct possibility. With-
out Brennan to articulate reasoned justifications for using heightened
scrutiny criteria to protect the interests of the disadvantaged, the ra-
tionality language so attractive to Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and
Kennedy is likely to find its way into an increasing number of ma-
jority opinions. Scalia's idea of rolling back the categories of cases
subject to strict scrutiny, which found majority support in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, could well take hold and flourish. Souter's
confirmation testimony gave no hint he supported this approach, but
the votes might already exist to form a coalition to accomplish it in
free exercise or other First Amendment arenas. It will be several
terms before a detailed assessment of Souter's impact can be made,
but the 5-4 decision in Sullivan v. Rust " ' may provide an early
indication of the trend to avoid the use of strict scrutiny in reviewing
First Amendment and substantive due process claims. Such an ap-
proach could well provide the foundation for direct challenges to Roe
v. Wade and other landmark decisions of the Brennan years.
312. See, e.g. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
313. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding regulations prohibiting the use of federal family
planning funds for abortion referrals or counseling).
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